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I. Introduction: The Paradox of Ireland in the European
Union
This article will examine the peculiar history of Ireland's
position within the European Union (EU).' It will argue that
tThe author is a Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. She received her
J.D. from Columbia University Law School and her Ph.D. from Stanford University.
She taught in the Law Faculty of University College Dublin between 1994 and 2000.
The author wishes to express appreciation for the research assistance of Heather
Salamone and Winnie Tran.
I Ireland became a member of the European Economic Community (a precursor to
the European Union) in 1972. Actes relatif A l'adh6sion aux Communaut6s Europdennes
du Royaume de Danemark, de l'Irlande, du Royaume de Norvge et du Royaume-Uni de
Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord [Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland,
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Ireland's political personality, based on post-colonial dependency,
has encouraged reliance by Ireland on a low corporate tax rate and
American multinational investment as a supposedly acceptable
strategy for pursuing a prosperity which had eluded Ireland for
decades after independence.2 Ireland took the easy route in that,
when it joined the European Economic Community (EEC) (later
the European Community (EC), now the EU), instead of actually
making products of interest to European and international markets,
it took advantage of its location within the common market to
single-mindedly "lure"'3 multinational corporations through tax
savings.' It is fair to say that Ireland's approach has lacked the
kind of loyalty to an idea that has been characteristic of the EU
from its founding.
Norway, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland], Mar. 27, 1972, 1972 J.O. (L 73) 4,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#accession. See also Council
Decision of the European Communities, Jan. 1, 1973, 1973 O.J. (L 2) 1, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#accession.
2 During this period of economic prosperity, Ireland was known as the "Celtic
Tiger." For an explanation of the term, "Celtic Tiger," see Colin Coulter, The end of
Irish history? An introduction to the book, THE END OF IRISH HISTORY? CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS ON THE CELTIC TIGER 1, 4 (Colin Coulter & Steve Coleman, eds.,
Manchester University Press 2003). See also, Rob Norton, The Luck of the Irish,
FORTUNE, Oct. 25, 1999 at 194, 213. Some of the companies of note that settled in
Ireland include Dell, Intel, Microsoft, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and SmithKline.
Meredith J. Coleman, Comment, The Republic of Ireland's Economic Boom: Can the
Emerald Isle Sustain its Exponential Growth?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 833, 852-56
(2000). For an analysis of modern Irish economic history in light of post-colonial
dependency theory, see generally JOHN KURT JACOBSEN, CHASING PROGRESS IN THE IRISH
REPUBLIC (1994). Jacobsen's analysis was published just before the Irish "Celtic Tiger"
years really took off. Jacobsen's insights might prove of particular interest as the boom
years come to an end. See id. at 70-95. He describes how Ireland has marketed itself as
uniquely receptive to multinational investment since throwing off the protectionism of its
first decades of independence. See id. at 45-69. Beginning in the 1960s, Ireland
intensified its efforts to woo U.S. multinationals, culminating in extreme levels of
multinational-led growth in the late 1990s.
3 Sheila Killian, Where's the Harm in Tax Competition? Lessons From US
Multinationals in Ireland, 17 CRITICAL PERSP. ACCT. 1067, 1080-81 (2006).
4 James Somerville, Ireland: The Ten Percent Manufacturing Corporation Tax
Rate and other Potentially Harmful Measures, 28 INT'L Bus. L. 346, September 2000
(noting that since 1980, a high percentage of U.S. high-tech manufacturing, software
development, and pharmaceutical industry investment in Europe came to Ireland.
Somerville describes the evolution of Ireland's 10% corporate tax rate for these
businesses, and for companies set up within Dublin's International Financial Services
Center [hereinafter IFSC], there is a 12.5% rate on corporate earnings).
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In exploring the nature of Ireland's anomalous presence in the
EU, this article will describe the usual manner in which the EU
"transforms" national history and the corresponding manner in
which national history impacts the EU. Ireland has resisted this
kind of transformative interaction. Although Ireland played the
part of an enthusiastic participant in the European project, it did
not in fact internalize EU values of solidarity and cooperation.
Rather, Ireland treated its access to the European market, and the
extremely low tax environment for U.S.-based multinationals, as a
kind of get-rich-quick scheme. While Irish behavior was
inconsistent with the EU "ideal" of mutual solidarity, it also
damaged the United States' obvious need for increased public
investments, which required adequate revenue from sources such
as corporate taxation.' Under this analysis, Ireland also short-
changed its own culture (including its indigenous business culture)
and physical environment.6 Over a long period of time, the EU
inexplicably allowed Ireland to use purely tax-based techniques
which, if widely imitated by other EU states, would have caused a
fiscal crisis for the Union.7 Despite a severe economic downturn
5 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1067, 1080-81 ("[T]he build-up of earnings in
profitable locations, such as Ireland will continue"). Id. at 1079. It should not be
assumed that European thinkers were unaware of the contradictory Irish position with
respect to EU "solidarity." Rather, the European Commission in particular struggled
with the question of how to stop Irish tax practice without creating a crisis. See
generally Colm Keena, Irish low-tax regime problematic-EU adviser, IRISH TIMES,
May 12, 2009 at 20 (covering the speech given in Ireland by a prominent European
intellectual, who stated that "Ireland's use of competitive tax policies was in conflict
with the concept of European solidarity").
6 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1079.
7 Ireland established corporate taxation rates that were and continue to be "among
the lowest in Europe." Julia R. Blue, Note, The Celtic Tiger Roars Defiantly:
Corporation Tax in Ireland and Competition within the European Union, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 443, 455 (2000). In 1980, Ireland introduced a 10% tax rate on
corporations involved in "manufacturing" and "manufacturing related services," with the
term "manufacturing" defined broadly. Id. at 455. The 1980s also saw the Irish
legislature add a vast range of economic sectors to the list of those entitled to benefit
from the lower 10% taxation rate. Id. at 456. Germany and France led efforts to
"harmonize" taxes within the EU, arguing that Ireland's low corporate tax rates had anti-
competitive effects among Member States. Id. Despite these protests from Germany
(with a 45% tax rate) and France (with a 33.33% tax rate), the EU continued to provide
Ireland with disproportionate amounts of economic aid. See id. at 458. In addition, the
European Commission allowed the continuation of a 10% corporate tax rate in areas
known as the Shannon-Customs Free Airport Zone [hereinafter SCAZ] and the IFSC
2010] 3
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that began in 2009, it appears that Ireland will, if at all possible,
maintain a passive and tax-dependent approach to economic
development.'
Part I of the article will focus on the political background of
Ireland's 2008 rejection of the EU's Lisbon (Reform) Treaty, a set
of treaty amendments designed to allow for greater ease of
decision making within an enlarged EU.9 In this regard, the EU's
duty of sincere cooperation,"o a kind of loyalty requirement
imposed on Member States, will be contrasted with Ireland's own
strategic and inward looking behavior within Europe. The Irish
rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon took place during a wave of
Euroskepticism that swept Ireland in the period leading up to the
first vote on the treaty." This article will argue that as Ireland saw
an end to its special, highly-indulged place within an EU that had
recently expanded to the East, a number of forces in Ireland
concluded that blocking the legal changes necessary for
under an exception that categorized Ireland as "underdeveloped" in order to qualify for
special treatment. See id. In response to outcries that Ireland's tax rate was "unfair," the
EU secured Ireland's promise to raise corporate tax rates to 12.5% beginning in 2003
with the passage of its Finance Act of 1999. Id. at 459-61. Most foreign corporations
will receive this 12.5% rate on "trading income" through 2025, thus allowing Ireland to
continue to boast some of the lowest corporate tax rates in the EU. See id. Further,
Ireland has a generous tax credit for expenditures on research and development as well
as an intellectual property deduction. Adrian Crawford, Ireland's Tax Regime Continues
to Impress, 17 INT'L TAX REv. 38, 39 (2006).
8 See Irwin Telzer, Ireland Stakes Own Recovery Path, WALL ST. J. (Europe)
(2009), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/NAWSJPUB:SB10001424052748703523504574603870
922982770.html (putting a positive spin on the fact that Ireland has decided to pursue
economic recovery by emphasizing its low tax benefits for multinational investors,
cutting public spending, and lowering labor costs). See also John Murray Brown &
Sophia Greene, Dublin to Open Door for Hedge Funds, F. TIMEs, December 19, 2009, at
15 (explaining that Ireland has recently passed legislation "to make it easier for hedge
funds based in the Cayman Islands and other tax havens to move to Dublin").
9 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:en:HTML [hereinafter
Treaty of Lisbon].
10 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
10, 11(2), Dec. 24, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm.
11 THE BROOKINGS INST., IRELAND'S REJECTION OF THE LISBON TREATY (2008),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0616-lisbon-treaty bindi.aspx.
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enlargement would be an appropriate stance.12 Following the 2008
vote, however, the Irish economy began to experience a set of
severe shocks." This in turn caused a rapid disintegration of
national self-confidence and a wish to return to the safety of the
European "fold."l 4 A second Lisbon vote was called for, and the
"reform treaty" passed by a wide margin on October 2, 2009."
As context for this, Ireland, once held up by the EU as its
greatest success story, had lost some of its luster since the EU's
2004 and 2007 enlargements into Eastern Europe.' 6 A number of
the new entrant countries, including Poland, Latvia, and others,
appeared to be following Ireland's lead, enticing multinational
investment through low tax rates, while simultaneously accepting
European assistance in the development of infrastructure." As
these self-interested techniques have proliferated, the
unsustainability of allowing this kind of opportunistic use of the
EU has become increasingly apparent.'1 At the same time, the EU
12 Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania,
Latvia, Cyprus, and Malta joined the EU in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in
2007. The European Union, A Growing Family, EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/growingfamily/index en.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
13 See, Conor O'Clery, Irish Economy Nears Collapse, GLOBAL PosT (Jan. 13,
2009), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/ireland/090113/irish-economy-nears-
collapse (noting the beginning of the economic downfall).
14 Ted Bromund, Vote Until You Get It Right: Ireland and the E.U. Constitution,
Redux, THE NEW LEDGER PUB'G CO. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://newledger.com/2009/10/vote-
until-you-get-it-right-ireland-and-the-eu-constitution-redux ("But as Irish confidence has
waned, the public perception has grown that Ireland had better accept its fate and
dissolve itself more fully into the European future").
15 See Graham Ruddick, Lisbon Treaty Approval Could Save Ireland 6200m a Year
in Debt Costs, TELEGRAPH (UK) (Oct. 3, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/6258132/Lisbon-Treaty-approval-could-
save-Ireland-200m-a-year-in-debt-costs.html. Following Ireland's "no" vote in June
2008, Ireland began suffering its first recession since 1983. See id. Voters were now
viewing the Lisbon Treaty as "an 'essential first step towards economic recovery."' See
id.
16 See Heather Stewart, Henry McDonald, & Elena Moya, Foreign Firms and
Investors Flee from Wounded Celtic Tiger, GUARDIAN (UK) (Feb. 19, 2009).
17 See, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, New EU Report Shows U.S. Corporate Tax Rate Out
of Step With Global Trends, TAX FOUND., TAX POLICY BLOG (June 30, 2010),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/blog/show/26470.html.
18 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 856-70 (noting the negative consequences of
Ireland's boom, including struggles with the EU, labor problems, cultural disintegration,
and environmental degradation). See also Michael Mikiciuk, Foreign Direct Investment
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
institutions have displayed continuing reluctance to interfere with
Member State autonomy with respect to levels of direct taxation. 9
Part II of this article will examine reasons why Ireland never
integrated its national consciousness with that of the EU's
overriding ideals. It will argue that the EU normally transforms
the vexed national histories of its Member States, and it will
suggest why Ireland was resistant to this process. It will also
discuss the fact that one of Ireland's key motivations in turning to
the EU was casting off its dependence on Britain.20 Meanwhile,
the EU viewed Ireland in friendly terms because of its historical
conflict with Britain.2 1 However, unlike most of the other EU
Member States, Ireland has never internalized key elements of
altered political consciousness as a result of EU membership.2 2
Part III will look more closely at the actual techniques that
Ireland has used throughout its membership in the EU, in
particular, at the tax-related vehicles by which Ireland delivered
benefits to primarily U.S.-based multinationals. Ireland has
Success in Ireland: Can Poland Duplicate Ireland's Economic Success Based on
Foreign Direct Investment Policies?, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 65 (2006)
(discussing Poland's investment strategies and taxation schemes and analyzing whether
Poland can replicate Ireland's success).
19 Unanimity is required for dealing with direct taxation rates. See EU Tax Policy
Strategy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/taxation/gen info/tax_policy/indexen.htm (last
updated Oct. 12, 2010, 4:22 PM), noting that
as far as other [direct] taxes are concerned, Article 94 provides for the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, to adopt
provisions for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative
provisions of the [m]ember States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the common market." It also notes that "[t]he Commission
considers that retaining unanimity for all taxation decisions will make it
difficult to achieve any of the tax coordination necessary for Europe and has
made proposals for a move to qualified majority voting in certain tax areas.
20 See, FINTAN O'TOOLE, SHIP OF FOOLS: How STUPIDITY AND CORRUPTION SANK
THE CELTIC TIGER 171-72 (2009) (discussing Ireland's historical dependence on Britain,
and its continued adherence to British and American ideas of the free market).
21 Id.
22 See id. at 26-45 (providing a scathing vision of Ireland's political culture).
O'Toole, a respected Irish Times journalist, demonstrates how Irish politics rely on a
crass and corrupt set of alliances between business and political operators, and how
economic trickery is central to this reality. Id. at 26-45.
6 [Vol. XXXVI
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managed to become a European base for U.S. multinationals in
their quest to avoid an appropriate level of taxation, i.e.,
appropriate with regard to their responsibility to assist in social
development within the United States or elsewhere.23 Ireland has
presented its tax rates as simply part of healthy tax competition
within Europe, but this is certainly a disingenuous position.2 4
Part IV will set out some of the key themes in Irish political
history as an aide to understanding how Ireland has attempted to
use its position in Europe to further its own narrow needs. This
section will also look at how the huge boom of the "Celtic Tiger"
years in Ireland produced adverse effects on the Irish natural and
cultural environment, which parallels earlier Irish willingness to
abandon even its own language in the name of short-term
25prosperity.
The conclusion of this article argues that Ireland has placed
itself in a false and unsustainable position in relation to the EU and
the United States and speculates on whether the contradictions of
Ireland's approach may at last be forced into plain view. Political
elites in Ireland appear to hope that tax avoidance vehicles aimed
at global corporations, including such ingeniously devised ones as
the "patent royalty exemption,"2 6 can continue to provide jobs
from multinationals headquartered in Ireland and that, even
assuming the levels of prosperity seen in the boom years will not
23 See Byoung-Inn Bai, The Code of Conduct and the EU Corporate Tax Regime:
Voluntary Coordination without Harmonization, 15:2 JOURNAL OF INT'L AND AREA
STUDIEs 115 (2008) (discussing how Ireland gives tax breaks and preferential tax rates
for investors).
24 See Joshua D. Moore, The Economic Importance of Tax Competition for Foreign
Direct Investment: An Analysis of International Corporate Tax Harmonization
Proposals and Lessons from the Winning Corporate Tax Strategy in Ireland, 20 PAC.
McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 345, 370-72 (2007) (writing that "[m]any critics
characterize government positions in tax competition as being either a prisoner's
dilemma leading to a race to the bottom or the similar winner's curse phenomenon.
Ireland stands in contrast to these claims, providing a model of active and practical
involvement in a growth-oriented national economic policy").
25 See generally, FRANK McDONALD & JAMEs NIx, CHAOS AT THE CROSSROADS
(2005), asking the baleful, yet important, question, "[d]o we have any idea where we are
going, any idea at all about the kind of Ireland being created during these years of
prosperity?" Id. at 33.
26 See, e.g., A.L. GOODBODY, PATENT INCOME EXEMPTION (2009),
http://www.algoodbody.com/GetAttachment.aspx?id=EA5649AF-D782-4467-9A34-
556DIO690B84.
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return, crisis can be avoided.2 7 Further, there is no evidence that
any more complex, culturally appropriate economic planning is
taking place on the part of the Irish government.
II. Four Green Fields Meet Technocratic Cosmopolitanism
A. Historical Incoherence and "European" Ireland
The story of Irish economic and social development over the
past two centuries is a potpourri of political themes, listed here in
only rough chronological order: resistance to colonial domination;
the rise of nationalism as a call to arms; civil war; the formation of
a credible nation state; a vexed relationship with a "Catholic"
political identity; nationalistic protectionism; identification with
Third World (anti-colonial) liberation; entry into the European
Economic Community as a "way out" of economic stagnation and
underachievement; and the creation of a low tax environment
within the European market that allowed Ireland to be one of the
principal recipients of U.S. high-tech investment, along with a
garbled championing of unfettered (ironically more British-style)
capitalism at odds with the EU's social market.2 8 Oppressed and
manipulated by the British for generations, Irish political culture
has found ways to embrace and exact benefits from the dominant
systems within which Ireland has had to exist.29 This tradition has
been carried on by the modern Irish state." Ireland as a political
27 See generally, Glenn R. Simpson, Wearing of the Green: Irish Subsidiary Lets
Microsoft Slash Taxes in US and Europe: Tech and Drug Firms Move Key Intellectual
Property to Low-Levy Island Haven, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2005, at Al (describing how
high-tech U.S. firms route profits through Ireland for this purpose).
28 See generally ALVIN JACKSON, IRELAND: 1798-1998 (1999) (discussing Ireland's
history over the past two centuries).
29 See JACOBSEN, supra note 2, at 45-47 (explaining that "by 1703, only 14 percent
of the land was in native (Catholic) hands," and describing the manipulation and
coercion to which the Irish economy was subjected, based entirely on British economic
and political needs). Jacobsen also notes the difficulties faced by a newly independent
Irish state, which "presided over a primarily commodity-exporting economy." Id. at 49.
30 See BRIGID LAFFAN & JANE O'MAHONY, IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 31-
55 (2008). Laffan and O'Mahony write:
[T]he self-perception of Ireland in the EU was of a small, poor, peripheral
member. As a net beneficiary of EU funds, successive Irish governments and
negotiators sought to maximize receipts of EU funding . . . Ireland was said to
be suffering from a 'sponger syndrome.'
[Vol. XXXVI8
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collective has been quintessentially reactive but undeniably
ambitious, and its role within the EU has reflected a self-interested
passivity that Irish governments have worked hard to conceal."
Such dissimulation was necessary because of the disharmony
between the Irish "orientation" within Europe (fundamentally
focused on self-interest) and foundational Community ideals of
solidarity, cooperation, and mutual concern." To borrow a term
from popular psychology, the EU has been Ireland's "enabler" in
political and economic self-delusion."
The question to be asked at present is what political and
economic persona is available to Ireland at the important
crossroads of 2010/2011? Having overstated its own economic
and social performance within the EU, having flirted with
Euroskepticism in 2008 until scared out of it by a major economic
meltdown, and having used up the most advantageous economic
"schemes" modern global capitalism has to offer, Ireland is
apparently adrift and uncertain.3 4 Ireland, for all the reasons of
Id. at 31.
31 See id. at 31-55.
32 See id. at 32. "Irish policy [toward the EU] was dominated by the desire to
maximize receipts from EC funds, while minimizing the amount of interference in
domestic policy (in the application of funds, competition policy and other areas) and
seeking derogations on difficult parts. The Irish approach was to ask what Brussels
could do for the Irish economy rather than the reverse." Id.
33 See Blue, supra note 7, at 458, 461 (noting that the Commission granted an
exception to Ireland as an "underdeveloped" area, which allowed the government to
extend its 10% to the SCAZ and the IFSC, despite provisions of the EC Treaty and the
EC's official sanctioning of Ireland's 1999 Finance Act, which allows Ireland to set its
corporate tax rate at 12.5%). See also Arthur Beesley, Reforms a Threat to Investment in
Ireland, IRISH TIMES, May 6, 2009 (discussing Ireland IDA's chief executive, Barry
O'Leary, as having adopted a relaxed stance in response to Obama's tax reform
proposals) Despite the "relaxed stance," O'Leary has sent top officials to the U.S. "to
deal with the issue." Id.
34 Ireland's current crisis may be linked to the idea that Ireland remained poor after
attaining independence in the 1920s because of cultural and economic "protectionism"
and became wildly successful after "liberating" itself through foreign investment and
belief in global trade. This crude template purported to account for all issues of wealth
and poverty-in the material and spiritual sense-of modem times. For one analysis of
this collective viewpoint, see ToM GARVIN, PREVENTING THE FUTURE: WHY WAS
IRELAND POOR FOR So LONG? (2004). Writ large, the late 1990s elite viewpoint within
Ireland was that a stagnant, repressive, heavily religious nation had been traded in at last
for a dynamic "advanced democracy." Id. at 231-32. That the "Celtic Tiger" model was
a generally positive one has been taken for granted by the vast majority of these and
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
developmental dissonance mentioned above, has found itself in a
situation where what comes next depends on two main factors:
whether the EU will act rigorously on the issue of EU-wide
corporate tax harmonization, and whether the United States will
act on the issue of U.S. corporate tax avoidance." There appears
to be no evidence that Ireland has developed an economic
roadmap that involves greater reliance on domestic innovation; in
that sense, no profound lessons have been learned from over-
dependence on the low taxation device."6
It is clear that the supranational European entity to which
Ireland hitched its destiny in 1973 requires a far greater degree of
political allegiance than Ireland has so far shown. It is equally
clear that extreme reliance on multinational investment to provide
the appearance of real prosperity required a far greater degree of
honesty about the risks of that strategy.3 8 Ireland is now in the
unenviable position of having to reinvent itself once more, with its
own global role as a tax avoidance vehicle under fire both from the
Obama administration and the EU itself, on grounds of fairness
and equity against which the Irish will find it difficult to mount
other Irish thinkers. Id. at 225-26.
35 See, e.g., Alex Ritson, European 'Tax Havens' Face Obama Action, BBC NEWS
(May 6, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/8036914.stm (specifically saying that
"Ireland and the Netherlands are two countries which could fall foul of President
Obama's plan to crack down on tax havens").
36 See generally, LAFFAN, supra note 30 (assessing the extent of Ireland's
integration into the EU and whether more integration should take place); Ruddick, supra
note 15 (noting that in 2008, U.S. corporations invested almost $150 billion in Ireland,
which was more than Brazil, Russia, India, and China combined).
37 Of Ireland's decision in 1972 to enter the EEC, Jacobsen writes that "few Irish
believed that their island could thrive outside the Treaty of Rome. An official mission to
Brussels became the economic equivalent of a pilgrimage to Lourdes. Thereafter an
infirm economy should revive, shriveled regions flourish, and benign investors spread
capital abundantly in the fair hills of Eire." JACOBSEN, supra note 2, at 96.
38 See Killian, supra note 3 (arguing that the enticement of foreign corporations
through low tax rates has had negative consequences on Irish life). As an example,
Killian points to Intel, the second largest information and communications technology
exporter in Ireland, which employs about 4,700 people in its plant in Leixlip, a small
town near Dublin. Id. at 1077. She notes that while job creation has been
unprecedented, Irish host communities are "dependent upon the . . . presence of
multinationals, which support employment, infrastructure, community projects, schools
and other needs. . ." Id. at 1078.
10 [Vol. XXXVI
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any compelling rebuttal." Despite the fierce defense offered by
Ireland's political establishment of its mono-focus on tax policy to
lure multinationals, saving American corporate giants' money
clashes with Ireland's traditionally redistributive historical
agenda.40 At present, the best the Irish governing classes can hope
for is that none of the impending challenges to its tax-reliant
policy bring about major change." The fact is that without
multinational investment in Ireland, there would scarcely be any
modern economy whatsoever. 4 2
Ireland is a small but unusually complex state precariously
positioned in the cross currents of EU exigencies and global
economics. The premise of this article is that, having come into
39 See John Hearne, Obama's Offshore Tax Reforms Prompt Jitters in Ireland,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MOMTOR (June 16, 2009),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0616/pO6sl5-woeu.html (writing that while Obama's
proposal "closing a corporate tax loophole could yield $60 billion for the United States,"
analysts predict that the new rules would "prompt a mass exodus of U.S. multinationals"
and "hollow out" the Irish economy); see also Killian, supra note 3, at 1075 (describing
how Ireland's tax scheme "falls foul" of the EU's "Code of Conduct on Business
Taxation" and the OECD's "Guidelines on Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes"). For
more on the type of legislation needed to end reliance by U.S. corporations on
international tax havens, see Anthony D. Todero, Note, The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act:
A Unilateral Solution to a Multilateral Problem, 19 MINN. J. INT'L.' L. 241 (2010).
40 Ireland's role in helping major U.S. corporations to lower their international tax
bills has been enormous. See Killian, supra note 3, at 1079-80 (describing how high-
tech U.S. firms route profits through Ireland for this purpose). While the tax rates are
extremely low in Ireland, the influx of such taxes provide huge amounts of money for
Ireland relative to its comparatively small size. See Simpson, supra note 27. See also
European Commission Requests Ireland to End Discriminatory Rules on Tax Treatment
ofPatent Royalties, FINFACTS IRELAND (Mar. 23, 2007),
http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article10009534.shtml (explaining that the
Commission formally announced that Ireland's royalty exemption is "incompatible with
the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services").
41 See AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IRELAND, Response to President Obama
Proposals on Tax Changes (May 5, 2009), http://www.amcham.ie/article.aspx?id=630
(quoting Pat Wall, chair of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland's Taxation
Group, as stating that "the proposed changes to deferral of tax on foreign profits is not as
severe as had been anticipated . . . ").
42 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1074 (noting the "Celtic Tiger" years were primarily
"due to Ireland's success in attracting foreign direct investments"). See also Niamh
Lyons, We Face Job Losses as EU Plots End ofLow Corporation Tax, THE DAILY MAL,
January 4, 2010, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com (enter in search title: We
Face Job Losses as EU Plots End of Low Corporation Tax).
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being in the 1920s as a pale imitation of the British state,43 and
without sufficient thought to cultural preservation or genuine
economic development, Ireland has in recent decades shown itself,
after a long period of stagnation, eager to grasp onto a wide
variety of opportunities presented by contemporary international
economic trends, also known as globalization." Ireland has
presented a series of faces to the world, most deriving from a
predisposition to reactive and insecure short-termism, a result of
centuries of survival as a close-to-home source of land and
treasure for Britain.45 The scope and scale of the opportunities
presented by the European market and American investment from
the late 1980s and early 1990s onward proved irresistible.4 6  The
Irish attempt to game the European market system worked as well
as the Irish could have hoped.47 It was to be expected that the EU
43 See JACOBSEN, supra note 2, at 50-51 (describing the newly independent Irish
state of the 1920s as a "pale replica"). In Chapter 3, Jacobsen writes that:
[T]he new state was a recreation of British institutions and economic ideology.
The civil service was 'Whitehall, writ small.' The legal system became more
British than the system the British themselves retained, and the tax system was
adopted with only minor modifications. Dail Eireann was a hibernicized House
of Commons; Seanad Eireann a feebler counterpart to the House of Lords. The
flags were Irish, but the flagpoles probably were manufactured in Britain.
Id. at 50-5 1.
44 See Michael Busby, Luck of the Irish: Ireland Has Become the Technological
Wonderland of the European Union, 11 INT'L TRADE L.J. 55, 55 (2002) (prophesying
that because "the Irish economy is highly dependent on foreign direct investment,
Ireland would be greatly affected if there were a downturn in the global economy" and
"therefore needed to be actively involved in the European Union"). Id. at 64 n. 1.
45 O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 97-101 (describing how the Irish property boom of
the late 1990s and early 2000s was fueled by resentment against years of enforced
underdevelopment and British oppression).
46 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1074.
47 See, e.g., Tom McEnaney, Tax Harmonisation 'by Back Door' Threatens our
Economic Survival, IRISH INDEP. (Apr. 21, 2008),
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/tax-harmonisation-by-back-door-threatens-our-
economic-survival-1353847.html. McEnaney writes that "[i]t was one of the shrewdest
moves Ireland has ever made" when Ireland went to the EU authorities in 1995 to ask if
it could adopt an across the board 12.5% corporate tax rate, as opposed to the special
10% rate for multinationals that it had obtained before that time, and which was contrary
to EU non-discrimination rules. Id. He continues: "I hope there is a plaque somewhere
to the civil servants who persuaded the EU that there was no threat to our introducing a
common low rate of corporation tax." Id. McEnaney is refreshingly candid about the
motives of U.S. corporations who have invested in Ireland, stating that "...much is
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would have intervened at an earlier stage to discourage the Irish
economic model, but instead, the EU acted with uncertainty and
hesitancy when it came to the issue of unfair tax competition.4 8
Even an outline version of modem Irish history provides
crucial context for this analysis: the rise of nationalism and the
transition to a modem state; the infamous economic doldrums of
the 1950s; Ireland's role as champion of the developing world
during the 1960s and 1970s; its enthusiastic, if often feigned,
embrace of the EEC from 1973 through the present, which Ireland
milked for structural funds and market access;49 and Ireland's
ingenious though fatally flawed decision to rely on low corporate
sometimes made of our ability to speak English or our highly educated workforce; but
the principal reason foreign companies, and in particular American foreign companies,
have flocked to Ireland is low taxes." Id. "The luck of the Irish," though a clichnd
phrase, ultimately points to the Irish tendency to find a means of survival in adversity.
See LAFFAN & O'MAHONY, supra note 30, at 31; Ruddick, supra note 15. Recent Irish
economic "success" also played perfectly into the revisionist narrative of Ireland as a
modernizing, secularizing society, making rational market choices. See generally, R.F.
FOSTER, LUCK AND THE IRISH: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHANGE FROM 1970 (2008) (referring
to Irish "luck" advisedly and with a strong sense of irony).
48 The issue of tax competition goes well beyond a mere technocratic one and
strikes at the heart of EU solidarity. For an introduction to some of the underlying EU
tax issues, see Tracy A. Kaye, Europe's Balancing Act: Trends in Taxation, 62 TAX L.
REv. 193, 193-94 (2008) (noting that
[t]he fine line between national sovereignty and European Community law was
drawn by placing strict limitations on the authority of the Community to
implement legislation related to taxation and reserving the power to levy direct
taxes for the Member States. Despite this cautious approach to relinquishing
national sovereignty in the realm of direct taxation, Member States were still
bound to the goal of developing a single common market by the Treaty
Establishing the European Community).
49 European Structural and Cohesion Funds are designed to help new entrants to the
EU catch up economically. They are aimed at infrastructural and other foundational
improvements, to assist new EU Member States in taking advantage of the market
advantages of membership. See David Bailey & Lisa De Propris, The 1988 Reform of
the European Structural Funds: Entitlement or Empowerment?, 9 J. EuR. POL'Y 408
(2002). Ireland received huge amounts of structural funding at a crucial time. See After
30 years, Our EU Structural Funds are Leaving Us, IRISH INDEP. (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/after-30-years-our-eu-structural-funds-are-
leaving-us-72891.html (noting Ireland's total was approximately 620 billion in today's
money, most of which was paid out by German taxpayers, and amounted to 3% of GNP
in the early years, and 2% of GNP annually between 1993-1999). The article closes with
a telling quote from former Prime Minister Albert Reynolds, that even though Ireland is
far from where it was in those early days, "of course, you would always take more
money if you could get it." Id.
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tax rates aimed at U.S. multinationals as a primary means of
economic growth.o As described above, through several
relatively simple legal stratagems, Ireland became the recipient of
a huge amount of foreign investment, mainly from the United
States." Given its small size, this rapid infusion of capital all but
guaranteed that Ireland would be drastically altered in every
sense.5 In light of the insecure cultural basis on which the Irish
state was constructed, it is hardly surprising that what remained of
the Irish language, culture, and physical landscape would be
quickly threatened by this process. 3 It is ironic that EU
environmental rules came to be invoked by some non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) as a means of attempting to
preserve what the Irish government and much of the Irish public
were content to destroy in the name of progress.S4
50 See Bai, supra note 23 (providing an introduction to Ireland's low corporate tax
policy).
51 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1074; Ruddick, supra note 15 (citing that in 2008
alone U.S. companies invested almost $150 billion into Ireland, more than into Brazil,
Russia, India, and China combined).
52 U.S. academic writing on Ireland's tax policy and economic success in the 1990s
has often portrayed EU attempts to eliminate unfair tax competition in Europe as
detrimental to Ireland, ignoring the context in which Irish tax policy has played out.
Blue characterizes Ireland as a misunderstood hero. See Blue, supra note 7, at 443
(portraying Ireland's recent economic choices as part of its "independent identity").
53 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1078-80 (discussing Ireland's high level of
economic inequality, health industry crisis, persistent poverty and homelessness, and
lower employment rates among Ireland's minority groups); see also Coleman, supra note
2, at 865-70 (analyzing Ireland's cultural disintegration and labor problems); see
generally MCDONALD & Nix, supra note 25 (discussing Ireland's developer-led growth
and landscape destruction).
54 There are many examples of environmentalists enduring heavy criticism in
Ireland, where good planning is feared as a block to progress. Jacobsen traces this to the
early days of Irish reliance on multinational investment, writing:
The foreign industrial presence aggravates this tendency. Any 'interference'
with development draws heavy official fire. In 1978, a multinational chemicals
firm took its business elsewhere when planning permission was delayed because
residents sought pollution control assurances .... Dismissing the barbaric local
dissenters as 'unrepresentative,' the IDA anyway threatened to drop the
[County] Clare district as an industrial zone.
JACOBSEN, supra note 2, at 142.
For a sense of the degree to which Ireland's economic boom clashed with EU
environmental requirements, see Niamh Connolly, Ireland High Among EU
Environmental Offenders, SUNDAY Bus. POST ONLNE (Jan. 31, 2010),
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Ireland has conducted a difficult balancing act on the issue of
corporate tax policy, i.e., convincing the EU that its tax regime
was not anti-EU in nature and hoping that the U.S. corporations on
which Ireland relied would be allowed to continue to avoid taxes
that might have otherwise been usefully spent within the United
States." As the EU moved forward with enlargement into Eastern
Europe in 2004, fulfilling a long held ambition to project a more
unified image on the world stage via the Lisbon ("Reform") Treaty
amendments, the Irish, who had never really identified themselves
as members of a mutually supportive grouping of states, balked.
The Irish vote in June 2008 against the Lisbon Treaty represented
a predictably negative reaction by a country facing an end to its
opportunistic use of the EU, as opposed to the more genuine
participation in a "project" that characterized Continental
understandings of the EU. The advent of the controversial
http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2010/01/31/story47083.asp (noting that "Ireland is
among the worst offenders when it comes to infringing EU environmental laws,
according to new figures." Ireland's violations run the gamut from water quality and
waste disposal through to archaeological protection). The environmental network,
Friends of the Irish Environment (FIE) keeps a tally of enforcement actions being
pursued against Ireland. See EU Environmental Infringement Cases Against Ireland,
FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENVIRONMENT (Sept. 2010), available at
http://www.friendsoftheirishenvironment.net/cmsfiles/fles/library/eu_infringments 200
5_2009.pdf (setting out a table of these actions against Ireland); see also Anita Guidera,
Ireland Last to Put EU Environmental Treaty into Law, IRISH INDEP. (Mar. 24, 2008),
http://www.independent.ie/national-news/ireland-last-to-put-eu-environment--treaty-
into-law-1325941.html (noting that "Ireland has been dragging its heels when it comes to
enacting EU legislation which gives the public greater involvement on environmental
issues").
55 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1075-76 (describing Ireland's 12.5% tax scheme as
a "difficult dance" because, while it is critical for Ireland to keep its rates low, the
country is increasingly being labeled as a tax haven and an international pariah). With
respect to the United States, Ireland's tax strategy has ensured that corporate profits can
be repatriated to the United States with minimal adverse tax consequences. Id. at 1076.
U.S. companies are apparently sensitive to criticism over their use of Irish tax avoidance
opportunities. See Microsoft to Hide Irish Tax Haven Data of Subsidiaries that have
Saved it Billions ofDollars in US Taxes, FINFACTS (Mar. 9, 2006),
http://www.fmfacts.ie/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10005150.shtml. Apparently
in reaction to publicity engendered by a Wall Street Journal expos6, Microsoft took steps
in 2006 to "shield from the public the value of Tax Haven transactions of two Irish-
registered subsidiaries that have enabled it to save billions in U.S. taxes," namely Round
Island One and Flat Island Company. The two companies are reported to be operated out
of the Dublin offices of corporate lawyers Matheson Ormsby Prentice. Id.
56 See generally Matt Qvortrup, Rebels Without A Cause? The Irish Referendum on
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political group "Libertas," led by the mysterious Irish-British
figure Declan Ganley, had the potential to remake Ireland into the
epicenter of a new, more fundamentalist and neo-liberal
Euroskepticism than any that had been seen before in pan-
European politics.57
The economic meltdown experienced by Ireland in the months
that followed the Lisbon rejection reflected the country's heavy
dependence on American investment and the grossly inflated
property values across the country. 8 The cheers that greeted
rejection of the Lisbon Treaty quickly died away, with voters
appearing to accept the inevitability of seeking protection and
support from Europe in the face of accelerating economic
collapse.5 9 As the Celtic Tiger began to lose steam in 2009, the
daring experiment in repudiation of the EU was also faltering.
The move by the Irish public towards acceptance of the Lisbon
the Lisbon Treaty, 80 POL. Q. 1 (2009); John O'Brennan, Ireland Says No (Again): The
12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, 62 PARL. AFF. 258 (2009); Anatole
Abaquesne de Parfouru, 'See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil': The Irish
Referendum and Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, 15 MAAsTRIclrr J. 493 (2008). Some
have seen the Irish "no" vote as a perfectly normal response on the electorate's part due
to their confusion over Lisbon's implications, and therefore no cause for alarm. See,
e.g., Maria Cahill, Ireland's Constitutional Amendability and Europe's Constitutional
Ambition: The Lisbon Referendum in Context, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1191 (2008) (encouraging
readers to consider the Irish rejection of Lisbon in light of Irish constitutional
requirements, and, in particular, the Irish approach to constitutional referenda as a means
of changing the Irish Constitution, including on those occasions when the change is
brought about by EU legal developments).
57 The Libertas website was scathing in its description of the EU's methods and
intentions. Although the website disappeared after the party's failure to gain more than a
few seats in the European Parliamentary elections of June 2009, its earlier descriptions
gave no ground at all to the political and social benefits brought about by the EU.
58 Stewart et al., supra note 16 (explaining Ireland's current financial "meltdown").
The article notes:
More than a year into a devastating housing crash, and with its export-
dependent growth suffering badly, Ireland is mired in a deep financial and
economic crisis . . . Not only is the property crisis devastating Ireland's
consumers, but many of the jobs created in the boom are now disappearing.
Last month computer manufacturer Dell announced that it was shedding 1,900
workers at its Limerick plant, moving some to Poland and contracting out
others.
Id.
59 See Ruddick, supra note 15 (arguing that proponents of the Lisbon Treaty view it
as vital to helping Ireland's beleaguered economy).
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Treaty in the fall 2009 referendum re-run indicated that the EU
offered at least safety and continuity, if not the easy ride to
prosperity of earlier times."o Tellingly, the supposedly Europe-
wide Libertas movement posted a dramatic inability to connect
with European voters in the June 2009 European Parliamentary
elections, when even founder Declan Ganley failed to gain a seat
for the new party.6 1
Ireland's false position vis a vis the EU on the one hand, and
its own history on the other, had never been more troubling than at
the end of the long and rapacious economic boom, extending
roughly from 1995 through 2008.62 As the events described above
came together into a perfect storm of political confusion, a report
on the widespread and systematic abuse of children in religious-
run institutions in Ireland over the course of decades was a further
blow to modem Irish self-confidence.6 3 Ireland's tendency to see
itself as exceptionally marvelous or exceptionally terrible played
out in these events, leaving its future relations with Europe in a
state of great uncertainty.
60 Eric Pfanner, For Irish, E.U. May Stand for Economic Unity, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/world/europe/05ireland.html
("Outrage at Irish politicians, laced with fear of what might have happened to the
economy if voters had repudiated the E.U. a second time, seems to have been the main
reason for the stunning turnabout in a referendum on the treaty").
61 See Vladimira Briesteska, Is it the End of the Line for Libertas?, NEW EUROPE,
July 5, 2009, available at http://www.neurope.eu/print.php?id=95331 ("Despite big
expectations of winning 100 seats in the European Parliament, the pan-European and
anti-Lisbon Treaty party Libertas suffered a striking and harrowing defeat in the
European elections. . . . Moreover, the Eurosceptic party decided to close its offices in
Brussels. . . . Is this the beginning of the end?").
62 For a dramatic description of the property bubble of the pre-2009 boom years,
see O'Toole supra note 20, at 9. O'Toole notes "Irish house prices had fallen more
rapidly than any others in Europe. With a fifth of its office spaces empty, Dublin had the
highest vacancy rate of any European capital and was rated as having the worst
development and investment potential of twenty-seven European cities. The Irish stock
exchange had fallen by 68% in 2008-a much more dramatic collapse than in other
developed countries. The average Irish family had lost almost half its financial assets.
Id.
63 ALAN CARR, COMM'N TO INQUIRE INTO CHILD ABUSE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
ADJUSTMENT OF ADULT SURVIVORS OF INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE IN IRELAND (2008),
available at www.childabusecomnission.ie/rpt/pdfs/CICA-VOL5-03.pdf
64 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 100-02 (discussing Ireland's precarious
economic state caused by housing prices rising more than twice as much as parts of
Europe). "[I]t was a weird unfolding in the globalised twenty-first century of an
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Three essential propositions ensue from this analysis. The first
is that modem Ireland should have pursued a more varied,
sustainable, and internationally viable strategy than simple
reliance on U.S. multinational investment based on tax
inducements.65 Second, the EU should have been more forthright
with Ireland about the uncooperative and anti-EU nature of the
Irish tax policy and should have taken creative steps to deal with
the matter of fair and sustainable Irish economic development.
Third, if Ireland has come to the end of this economic and political
phase, it will be forced to find a means of economic survival that
is not based purely on tax. Domestically, regionally, and
internationally, Irish political culture has been based almost
entirely on the power of tax avoidance schemes. On the other
hand, it is plain that many Irish policy makers continue to hope
that this tax-based methodology will miraculously survive; most
also display continued indifference to the cultural and
environmental implications of Ireland's "investment boom"
approach.66
III. The EU, Member State Histories, and Technocratic
Reformulations
A. Ireland as a "Part" of the EU?
The history of each EU Member State drags invisibly behind
as that history comes into contact, day by day, with the
intensely local nineteenth century psychodrama." Id. at 101.
65 Some writers have questioned the "sustainability" of Irish prosperity in terms of
its continued success. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 2. In the present article, I am using
the term to refer instead to intellectual, historical, and "Europeanist" viability.
66 It is noteworthy that Irish intellectuals have begun to reflect the sense that
Ireland is adrift in the post-Celtic tiger years. See Declan Kiberd, Returning to the Spirit
of Tiger Ireland is Pointless. Only a Completely New Political Movement Can Tackle
the Challenges, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 13, 2010),
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2010/0313/1224266184020.html (stating
that during the boom years,
[a] vulgar, heedless populism led to an assertion that unrestrained market forces
were somehow compatible with excellence and ethics, and to a widespread
destruction of those with real professional expertise. As gesture took the place
of structure, the very people who now call for regulation were just a few years
ago the ones baying loudest for deregulation of everything from transport to
heath services).
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rationalized legal system known as the European Union. This
contact provides an alternative way of "knowing" for each of the
Member States-knowing themselves and their fellow EU
Member States.6' The endurance of the EU is attributable to its
legally binding quality; as a law-based transformer of historical
relations, it thus does a far better job than any possible inter-
governmental organization. While the populations of the
respective European Member States certainly find themselves
wearied or inspired, in turn, by the EU as a construct, the EU has
at least been consistently accepted by an EU public that
acknowledges its permanency and overall success.
For mortal Continental rivals France and Germany, the fact
that the EU exists as a guarantor of permanent cooperation is
undeniable." For the southern European states, entry into the EU
created therapeutic contact with a soothing, Continental
technocracy.7 0 Religious passion, military dictatorship, and other
67 This relationship between national and supranational political cultures is
explored in a fascinating collection of essays. In particular, see James Henry Bergeron's
An Ever Whiter Myth: The Colonization of Modernity in European Community Law, in
EUROPE'S OTHER: EUROPEAN LAW BETWEEN MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY, 3-26
(Peter Fitzpatrick & James Henry Bergeron, eds., 1998).
At the heart of the discourse of EC law is myth. Not myth as a child's fable, but
as a transforming signifier capable of re-ordering the 'radical imaginary' of the
European polity. The successful 'constitutionalization' of the EC Treaties, and
the consequential relative autonomy of the Community, owes much to the
incorporation into European Community law of the mythical structures of
modernity which imbue national political culture and, increasingly, the political
culture of a globalised West.
Id. at 4.
68 A survey by the European Commission done in the United Kingdom, historically
one of the least enthusiastic EU Member States, reported that citizens in the UK believe
that the EU has a role to play in the serious issues facing the EU, UK, and the world
generally (such as terrorism, climate change, global poverty etc.). It appears that even
the resistant British public believes the EU is a permanent feature on the political stage.
See FLASH EUROBAROMETER, THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 203 (May 2007) [hereinafter Attitudes], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/flash/fl203 en.pdf.
69 See Joschka Fischer, Address at Humboldt University in Berlin: From
Confederacy to Federation (May 12, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.dwfed.org/ppconfed_to_fed.html).
70 See Renwick McLean, Lessons of Spain and Portugal, NY TIMES, July 19, 2005,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/18/business/worldbusiness/1 8iht-funding2.html.
2010] 19
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
"pre-modern" attributes were cast off with the embrace of blander
notions of equality, technocratic competence, and transparency.7 '
And so it went, with each state, set of states, or region finding
itself liberated from the genuine complexities of the past in the
apparent, or rarified, complexities of the EU's acquis
72
communautaire. While the EU normally has the effect of
internally and externally "translating" national history, and thus
restraining disharmonious elements, it is doubtful whether EU
membership has had any such effect with regard to Ireland.
Although the EU rises and falls in popularity, based on
evolving perceptions of its role in bringing about positive or
negative outcomes, different forms of political cost have been
extracted from participating nations. The Member States have
understandably been asked to invest various forms of capital in the
ongoing creation of the EU.74 There is a basic straightforwardness
inherent in the European project, a mandatory allegiance to core
ideas that eschews real cynicism. Amorphous though it may
sound, there is a treaty-based requirement that Member States not
take any actions that would jeopardize the overall goals of the
EU.75  Despite the recent failure to fully "constitutionalize" the
EU, members are not meant to make light of core EU objectives. 6
71 Kevin Featherstone & George Kazamias, Introduction: Southern Europe and the
Process of 'Europeanization,' 5:2 SOUTH EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS, June 2000,
1-24; Heather Grabbe, The Governance of the EU: Facing the Challenge of
Enlargement, 9:2 NEw ECONOMY, June 2002, 113-17, available at
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grabbe_0802.html.
72 Heather Grabbe, European Union Conditionality and the Acquis
Communautaire, 23 INT'L' POL. Sci. REV. 249 (2002) (discussing conditionality of
entrance into the European Union based on economic and other factors, but that entrance
comes with great benefits for poorer countries).
73 See generally Marian Tupy, Opinion: Greek Debt Crisis a Hazard for EU,
GLOBAL POST (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/1 00213/opinion-greek-crisis-paves-way-
more-regulation (noting that disharmony in financial responsibility among EU members
has a negative effect on the whole).
74 See Baily & De Propris, supra note 49 (discussing structural and cohesion
funds).
75 See Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of
Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 763-64 (2004) (noting that Article 3, now Article
10 of the EC Treaty, requires that members "'take all appropriate measures' to ensure,
and 'abstain from any measure' that could compromise, the success of the treaty").
76 For a brief but revealing description of the rise of the idea of a European
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This is in large measure due to the systemic characteristics
mentioned above; that the EU is meant to meet, greet, and tame
history, purging "the idea of Europe" of the frightening and the
grotesque.7 7 This accounts for the central role reserved for law in
the development of the EU. Whereas Americans often appear
baffled at the willingness of Europeans to submit to the EU's
bureaucratic yoke, it is because Americans cannot successfully
identify with the longing to be set free from a messy and bloody
history. This is not to say that the reaction of each EU Member
State to the EU is identical or even broadly similar; on the other
hand, a main contention of this article is that the Irish reaction to
EU membership was outside the knowledge and experience of
Continental Europe."
There is reason to believe that Ireland did not especially wish
to be "known" through this Europeanizing process; rather, Ireland
needed to be misperceived by Continental Europe.79 Ireland was
naturally pleased to jettison its own deep and messy historical
preoccupation with the British, not to mention its consistent failure
to invigorate the economy of a state that had enjoyed
Constitution, see Koen Lenaerts, The Constitution For Europe: Fiction or Reality?, 11
COLUM. J. EuR. L. 465 (2005).
The Union, endowed with most basic organizational and material elements
founding an autonomous polity, including the right to mint money and a nucleus
of defense capabilities, differentiates essentially from a state-like structure
because of its coexistence with other sovereign entities. This difference lies at
the heart of European integration, which far from negating Members States'
identities and specificities, organizes their coexistence-united in diversity [the
Union's motto]-through the pooling together of their resources to pursue goals
of common interest.
Id. at 479. The Constitutional Treaty, as it was called, was rejected by Dutch and French
voters in 2005. Many of its provisions were repackaged into the Lisbon Treaty
amendments.
77 John Horvath, The European Ideal, TOwARD FREEDOM (July 15, 2005),
http://www.towardfreedom.com/europe/503-the-european-ideal.
78 LAFFAN & O'MAHONY, supra note 30, at 31.
79 O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 170-71
([T]he Irish sense of belonging in Europe turned out to be much weaker than it
had seemed. . . . It was not surprising that enthusiasm for the European project
was particularly high in Ireland. Yet, as it turned out, it was also particularly
shallow... The Celtic Tiger's tendency to snap at the European hand that had
fed it in its infancy was encouraged by the same politicians who, when it suited
them, insisted that the Irish should be good Europeans).
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independence since the 1920s. The Europeans, with their partial
and unsatisfactory history with Britain, were equally happy to
assist in the supposed decoupling of Ireland and Britain.80 Ireland
was eager to be airlifted out of the British sphere of influence, and
this fed into the EU script of lifting up new Member States one by
one. For Ireland, success within the EU was proof that it did not
need Britain, but had been, as it were, inescapably attached to
Britain due to physical proximity." For the EU's major players,
Ireland's success was proof that the EU regimen could transform
even the most under-performing European economy; also and not
insignificantly, Irish success meant that the Continentals could
effect this change in a way the British could not. A wealthy
Ireland, historically counter-intuitive, proved that the European
prescription really worked, even in the most difficult
circumstances.82 However, Ireland did not become genuinely
wealthy, unless national wealth is counted in GDP alone; it merely
pulled in U.S. investment through a crude and quite obvious
80 While all the EU Member States have used the EU as a new way of perceiving
their own political identities, in Ireland's case the unity and solidarity dimension seems
to have been lacking. As Ireland was mainly seeking release from its own historical
inferiority complex vis a vis Britain, it sought a shortcut to confidence that did not
include any sacrifice on behalf of the EU.
81 Ireland basks in role as the EU success story, EU BUSINESS (Mar. 21, 2007),
http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/employment/ireland.18/ (discusses Ireland's success
in EU).
82 The long-running sense of national failure can hardly be overstated. Despite
having achieved independent nationhood for most of its island country, the Irish did not
manage to establish any credible industrial base with which to sustain its population.
The 1950s were particularly difficult. See John Bradley, Changing the Rules: Why the
Failures of the 1950s Forced a Transition in Economic Policy-Making, in LOST DECADE:
IRELAND IN THE 1950's 105 (Dermot Keogh, Finbarr O'Shea & Carmel Quinn, eds.,
2004) ("The rapid recovery and growth of the main economies of Western Europe-after
an initial period of post-war reconstruction-cruelly exposed the poor performance of
the Irish economy"). The essay ultimately points to the post-1950s emphasis on foreign
investment as the key to Irish economic independence from Britain and to greater
prosperity. Bradley is a proponent of the common Irish view that the "protectionism" of
the 1930s through 1950s was a failure, and that the turn towards American investment
was the appropriate alternative. Bradley, like other writers in this genre, does not
entertain the idea that Ireland simply traded one form of dependence for another. Id. See
also Enda Delaney, The Vanishing Irish? The Exodus from Ireland in the 1950s, in THE
LOST DECADE: IRELAND IN THE 1950's 80-86 (Dermot Keogh, Finbarr O'Shea & Carmel
Quinn, eds., 2004) (exploring Irish fears of general depopulation in the 1950s, based on
the strikingly high levels of emigration and sense of powerlessness to stop it).
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mechanism: extremely low tax. It was the tax/European market
intersection that allowed Ireland to lasso such a huge amount of
investment relative to its size.84
For the EU to operate successfully, while it must simplify and
refashion, it should not fundamentally misrepresent or
misunderstand. The EU is based on a Grand Bargain and a
smaller set of bargains, a give and take in the service of an ideal."
Ireland's behavior not surprisingly mirrored its former behavior
towards Britain and the Commonwealth (though a far more
successful version of it), as well as the general behavior of Irish
emigrants throughout the diaspora generally. The familiar Irish
game plan was to figure out an available scheme, a formula for
obtaining money, and ride the wave. The main Irish objective
within the EU was internally focused and had little connection
with any overarching European ideals. It is only logical to
conclude that if all EU Member States were to approach the EU as
Ireland did, there would be no EU as it is generally understood.
As explained above, the device used by Ireland to provide an
appearance of grand economic transformation was a low tax
regime for multinational corporations, principally from the United
States," a technique that, when pushed too far, cannot be
83 In the late 1990s, the mainstream consensus in Ireland was that important
economic decisions had placed Ireland in a position of strength when compared to other
economies great and small. See, e.g., PAUL SWEENEY, THE CELTIC TIGER: IRELAND'S
CONTINUING EcoNOMIC MIRACLE (1999) (writing in the book's preface that "the Irish
economy entered a 'virtuous circle' from 1987, and since then, the economic
management of Ireland has been excellent in most areas and the players in the complex
interactions of economy and society have contributed very positively to sustaining the
high level of growth"). The very first page of the main text states that "Ireland has
become the 'Celtic Tiger' economy of Europe, and it is leading the European Union in
nearly every economic sphere." Id. at 1.
84 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1074; O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 93-94 (pointing
out that the vaunted Irish prosperity was very poorly distributed internally, and statistics
pointing to Irish economic growth could be highly misleading).
85 Preamble to the Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191),
available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/I 1992M/htm/1 1992M.html#0001000001.
86 The EU has so far been precluded by the Treaty's terms in this area from setting
a floor on corporate taxation rates within the EU. Even though the behavior of Ireland in
this respect is arguably contrary to EU common interests, Ireland has managed to avoid
real action by the EU because of the treaty requirement that changes of this type in tax
policy be entered into unanimously by all Member States of the Union. For a
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reconciled with EU notions of solidarity. The ultra-low tax
attracted inward investment to a degree that even the Irish
imagination could not have predicted." For a certain period,
Ireland was pulling in approximately 40% of all high-tech U.S.
investment in Europe. Positioned within the single European
market, developing its rickety infrastructure with the infusion of
European development capital, and enjoying participation in an
EU based on the concept of its members' "solidarity," Ireland
finessed its contradictory position with both skill and audacity."
Mainstream descriptions of the Irish economic performance were
at pains to avoid the impression, however justified, that Ireland
was profoundly over-reliant on tax-motivated inward investment.90
comprehensive discussion of the tax-related provisions of the Treaty, see Charles E.
McLure, Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law, and Cooperative Approaches to Harmonizing
Corporate Income Taxes in the US and the EU, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 377 (2008).
"Since each Member State is represented on the Council, as a practical matter the
requirement for unanimous consent implies that each Member State has veto power over
future EC tax legislation. This has, with only minor exceptions, prevented the use of EC
legislation to achieve either prescriptive or proscriptive harmonization of direct taxes,
including corporate income taxes." Id. at 381. Had it not been for this Treaty limitation,
it is all but certain the EU would have taken action to coordinate corporate tax rates long
ago. Indeed, coordinating Member State approaches to corporate taxation levels has
been under consideration by the European institutions since as early as the 1960s. See
also Jack Mintz and Joann Weiner, Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union, 62 TAX L. REv. 81, 89 (Fall
2008). ("The process [of company law reform] had begun shortly after the founding of
the European Community when the Neumark Committee in 1962 suggested harmonizing
company tax systems in the form of an imputation system with split rates").
87 Irish economic success has been described in extremely simplistic terms by
commentators, generally to the effect that Ireland was formerly a "closed" and
"protectionist" economy, but was a great success after it embraced "openness." See
Mikiciuk, supra note 18 at 90 (describing Ireland's transformation from "Europe's worst
to Europe's best-performing economy"). See also Busby, supra note 44, at 64
(describing how Ireland enticed foreign investors with its attractive economic policies).
88 Denis O'Hearn, Macroeconomic policy in the Celtic Tiger: A critical
reassessment, in THE END OF IRISH HISTORY 34, 38 (Colin Coulter and Steve Coleman
ed., 2003).
89 See Colin Coulter, The end of Irish history? An introduction to the book, THE
END OF IRISH HISTORY? CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE CELTIC TIGER, supra note 2, at
18-20 (explaining that the prosperity and supposed transformation of the Irish Republic
in the 1990s were based primarily on the desire of U.S. based multinational corporations
to lower their global tax bill).
90 See, e.g., Brendan Walsh, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in Ireland,
TAx REFORM IN CANADA: OUR PATH To GREATER PROSPERITY, 207-28 (H.G. Grubel ed.,
24
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The EU, based on far loftier concepts, first ignored and
eventually struggled to find the right tone in dealing with Ireland's
peculiar mode of engaging with Europe.91 On the one hand, as
indicated above, having pried Ireland away from the generally
distrusted British, the EU treated Ireland as a great success story.92
The EU, so the myth went, had effectively banished the economic
doldrums characteristic of prior Irish governments.93 It would
therefore be politically unseemly for the EU to publicly chide this
protdg6. On the other hand, with the 2004 enlargement into
Eastern Europe, ensuring genuine solidarity and preventing
investment poaching by the new entrants took on real urgency.94
The Irish had every reason to dread enlargement into Eastern
Europe, as the Irish Model of EU participation, if imitated, would
inevitably be more rigorously parsed and more clearly discouraged
with respect to the new entrant countries.
2005) (embedding the taxation factor in a "normalizing" narrative that looks at a number
of factors relevant to Irish success).
91 See Colm Kelly, CCCTB May be a Mixed Blessing, 18:2 INT'L TAX REv. 58
(2008).
92 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 170-71.
93 See Sara Collins, EU Raises Spectre of Hike in 12.5pc Corporate Rate, IRISH
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/eu-raises-spectre-of-hike-
in-125pc-corporate-rate-2361789.html (quoting Olli Rehn, "Ireland will not continue as
a low-tax country. But it will rather become [a] normal tax country in the European
context").
94 See Vessela Tchemeva, Bridging Europe's Solidarity Gap, EUOBSERVER.COM
(Feb. 27, 2009), http://euobserver.com/9/27693; see also Proud Poland Embraces an
Irresistible EU Future, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 16, 2009),
http:/Iblogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2009/06/proud-poland-embraces-an-irresistible-eu-
future/ [hereinafter Proud Poland] (discussing that Poland was not in favor of relaxing
EU entry criteria).
95 For an analysis of the long-running EU efforts to deal with the problem of
widely different corporate taxation rates across the Union, see Byoung-Inn Bai, supra
note 23, at 115 (positing the theory that, while closely aligned corporate tax rates were
desirable in light of the free movement of capital across Europe, the Member States have
been able to absorb negative fallout for this disharmony). The EU has also floated the
idea of a "Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base" (CCCTB), an idea that emerged
from a 2004 meeting of European finance ministers. See Colm Kelly, CCCTB May be a
Mixed Blessing, supra note 91 (writing that under the CCCTB, "[t]he aggregated profits
of a group of companies operating in the EU will be apportioned to each member state
based on a set of rules known as formulary apportionment.... [T]he criteria used to
determine the allocation are likely to be a combination of sales by destination, property .
. . and payroll").
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Ireland, as mentioned, is ambitious in its sense of self. This
may well derive from the fact that it was oppressed by one of the
greatest states and largest empires of them all, Britain.9 6 Whether
in alliance with the world's downtrodden or symbol of successful
modernity, Ireland has displayed a historical tendency to position
itself astride the strongest global trends.97 In the case of the low
tax-dominated period from the 1990s on, this approach led to a
remarkable bounce of apparent prosperity.9 8 Unlike countries such
as Norway, content to pursue their own ideal forms of farming,
fishing, and smaller-scale manufacture,9 9 Ireland has historically
seen itself as a nation miraculously linked to, even symbolic of,
major global trends, economic or otherwise. 00
Ireland, passive in its economic and cultural methodology, has
at the same time been extremely active in laying hold of EU and
indeed global economic opportunities.o'0 It may be that, after the
economic crisis in 2009, Ireland is experiencing a moment of
systems failure. 10 2  However, depending on European
developments, it is conceivable that Ireland will reconfigure itself
and find another international trend on which to base its sense of
importance.
B. An Anglo-Saxon Celtic Tiger?
As described above, Irish voters went to the polls in June 2008
96 Ireland was subject to British power for many years until partition in 1921.
97 As evidenced by Ireland aligning itself with the United Kingdom and
subsequently joining the EEC.
98 Patrick Barkham, The Victims ofIreland's Economic Collapse, GUARDIAN, May
26, 2010, § G2, at 4, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/26/ireland-
economic-collapse.
99 Ivar Ekman, In Norway, EU Pros and Cons (The Cons Still Win), NY TIMES,
October 27, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/europe/26iht-
norway.html (noting that Norway enjoys higher increases in GDP and a thriving fishing
economy).
100 Cf Featherstone & Kazamias, supra note 71.
101 Rory O'Donnell, The New Ireland in the New Europe, in EUROPE-THE IRISH
EXPERIENCE, DUBLIN: INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (2000), available at
www.nesc.ie/dynamic/docs/Europe-the%201rish%20Experience.doc. See, e.g., Ireland
Eyes Opportunities in Global Regulation Focus, HEDGEWEEk (July 29, 2010),
http://www.hedgeweek.com/2010/07/29/56352/ireland-eyes-opportunities-global-
regulation-focus (listing examples of global opportunity).
102 See O'Donnell, supra note 101, at 12.
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and resoundingly rejected the Lisbon Reform Treaty, a set of
amendments to the existing EU treaties, designed to allow for
greater ease of decision making in an enlarged Europe and also to
give Europe a more decisive role in world affairs.o 3 Standard
explanations for this negative reaction by Irish voters include the
argument that French and Dutch voters had rejected a largely
similar "Constitutional Treaty" a couple of years earlier, so Ireland
was in fact in the European mainstream. 0 4 It was also pointed out
that Ireland had first rejected, then after some tweaking accepted,
an earlier set of treaty amendments called the Nice Treaty, in 2001
and 2002.10 While all of this is factually true, there was an air of
resistance and hostility in the 2008 vote indicating that Ireland had
concluded that it had taken what it could from Europe, and that the
long ride on a surprisingly manipulable gravy train was coming to
an end. 06
More than any other EU country, Ireland's membership has
been characterized by an attitude of taking what it could and using
its place within the European market to service the needs of U.S.
multinationals, which accepted, in predictable fashion, this offer of
tax savings.107 In June 2008, judging by the popular mood, it
appeared that Ireland had rediscovered nationalism, the
foundational doctrine and touchstone of national identity, one that
delivered Ireland its independence from Britain and that delivered
it possession of a state.'08 While Ireland has relied on two
103 See Mateg Avbelj, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Ongoing Search for Structural
Equilibrium, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 521 (2010). See generally Paul Craig, The Treaty of
Lisbon: Process, Architecture and Substance, 33 E.L. REV. 137 (2008) (discussing the
major changes contained within the Lisbon Treaty amendments).
104 Grainne De Burca, The Lisbon Treaty No- Vote: An Irish Problem or a European
Problem? (University College Dublin Law Research Paper No. 03/2009, 2009).
105 See id. at 7 (mentioning Nice Treaty).
106 Ireland's Vote on the Lisbon Treaty: No Means No, THE TIMES (June 14, 2008),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading article/article4133301.ece.
107 See, e.g., Ruddick, supra note 15 (describing that "in the short term, avoiding the
harm of rejecting the [Lisbon] [T]reaty was more important than the merits of accepting
it" and that Treaty approval will be seen as Ireland getting its "act together"). See also
Coulter, supra note 89.
los Agnes Maillot, Sinn Fdin's Approach to the EU: Still More 'Critical' than
'Engaged'?, 24 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 4, 559-74 (December 2009) (analyzing how
Sinn Fein campaigns for European Parliamentary seats, but still presents itself "as a
resolutely republican and left-wing party"). Maillot also notes that for Sinn Fein to
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essential ingredients to achieve a striking degree of national
wealth-EU transfers, in the form of money given to assist Ireland
in developing infrastructure and low taxes for U.S.
multinationals-the Irish political elites, including journalists and
commentators, expressed little if any awareness of the irony of
Ireland's position.'O9 This double-dipping did not bring about any
deep-seated sense of gratitude or loyalty in Ireland towards the
European "project," with which Ireland simply failed to identify at
any profound level.
It should be noted that Ireland, under the political leadership of
Charles Haughey in the 1980s, took a step beyond providing tax
avoidance benefits to U.S. manufacturing industries, such as
medical device makers, pharmaceutical companies, and computer
companies."o In fact, Ireland positioned itself as a "processor" of
money in the form of nominally Irish-based companies in its
notorious International Financial Services Center (IFSC)."'
engage in such campaigning at all is a shift in party policy.
109 See Billie Morrow, Ireland: The Roads to Success, 19 PERSP. ON Bus. & ECON.
(2001), available at
http://www.lehigh.edu/-incntr/publications/perspectives/v I 9/Morrow.PDF. For a
detailed discussion of the extreme dependence of the Irish economy in the 1990s on
inward investment by U.S. multinationals, see O'Hearn, supra note 88, at 34-55 (". . . the
single overriding factor in the 'success' of the Celtic Tiger was the arrival of huge
clusters of foreign subsidiaries in a few sectors, and predominantly from the United
States"). Id. at 37. The Celtic Tiger has been extremely dependent on foreign activities,
particularly on rising exports from Ireland by U.S. computer and pharmaceutical
companies." Also, "[a]rguably, Ireland's most important function today is as a site
where U.S. companies can shift their products into Europe, while accumulating profits in
order to avoid taxation." Id. at 40. It is interesting to note that O'Hearn characterizes
Ireland as a "site" with a "function," pointing to the false and dependent, albeit
superficially successful, situation the Irish state had constructed for itself at the end of
the 1990s.
110 O'TOOLE supra note 20, at 27 (writing of the almost unbelievably extreme level
of corruption in Ireland during the years under Charles Haughey's leadership). "Ireland
became far more dependent on foreign investment for its manufacturing base." Id. at 15.
See F. Desmond McCarthy, How the Celtic Tiger Did It: Ireland's Rapid Convergence
with the Industrial World, BEYOND TRANSITION,
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/octnovdec02/pgs20-23.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2010); Steve Lohr, Irish Applaud Austerity Policies, NY TIMES, Aug. 15, 1988,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/15/business/irish-applaud-austerity-
policies.html?pagewanted=all.
1I The IFSC Story: What is Ireland's International Financial Services Centre?,
28 [Vol. XXXVI
THE TAX-DRIVEN TALE OF IRELAND IN THE EU
Purely and entirely tax based, for twenty years the center has
provided opportunities for international capital to find a low or no
tax environment in a jurisdiction less obviously questionable than,
for instance, the Cayman Islands." 2
While the European taxpayer was providing money for Irish
infrastructural development, U.S. corporations were being assisted
by Irish policies, even while these corporations were competitors
of European corporations.'" On the one hand, Ireland used its
image as a downtrodden member of the European family, with a
terrible past assignable to the mistrusted British, for purposes of
convincing Europe to help it play historical catch-up.1 4  On the
other hand, in order to lure U.S. high-tech investment, the Irish
created a new identity as a country filled with "young Europeans,"
educated to a high standard, English-speaking, eager, the ideal
employees."' Ireland insisted that a low tax regime was not the
only reason, perhaps not even an important reason, in the choice
U.S. corporations made to set up manufacturing and research and
development bases in Ireland."' 6  Aided by the British, who had
their own concerns about the survival of the City of London as a
thriving financial center, the Irish managed to keep Continental
attempts to create a common European approach to corporate
taxation levels at bay for many years.' 17 With enlargement into
FINANCEDUBLIN.COM,
http://www.financedublin.com/the-ifsc story.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
112 Compare The IFSC Story, supra note Il l, with O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 131
(providing the back story to the IFSC, noting how the Center has attracted vast swaths of
international profits from all kinds of industries, funneling billions of euros of capital
through the Center, while generally employing staff of only a few people).
113 See supra notes 7 and 109 and accompanying text (discussing Ireland providing
low tax rates to U.S. corporations).
114 O'TOOLE,supra note 20, at 170-71.
115 Jessica Poyner, Investment in Ireland: The Enticement of U.S. High-tech
Industry to the Emerald Isle, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. 195 (1997); Foreign Investment,
Investment in Ireland, Irish Investors & the IDA Ireland, IDA IRELAND,
http://www.idaireland.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Foreign Investment]
(listing the reasons why Ireland is a favorable place to do business). Id.
116 Cf BEESLEY, supra note 33 (suggesting that the Irish have long used corporate
tax rates to attract foreign investment).
I17 See, e.g., Damon Lambert, Red Lines, White Flag, White Lies, Blue Flag?,
GLOBAL VISION, July 8, 2007, at 15, available at http://www.global-
vision.net/RedLinesWhiteflagWhiteliesBlueflag-thetruthbehidntaxharmonisation.htm
(providing discussion of the free market backlash against EU attempts to coordinate
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Eastern Europe, the idea that any one Member State could provide
a completely out of sync low-tax environment was more
problematic than ever before."'
In the process of achieving superstar status as the little nation
that could,l' Ireland experienced a great deal of internal
destruction. Ireland has a poor record of compliance with EU
environmental standards, and the European Commission has
frequently brought Ireland before the European Court of Justice.'2 0
Compared with other European countries, Ireland also has a weak
record on cultural preservation.' 2 ' Having let its language languish
more than a hundred years ago, Ireland was equally unperturbed
by the rapid loss of landscape that occurred in the 1990s.'22 Native
speakers of Irish Gaelic before the boom found their linguistic
habitats further threatened by the holiday home phenomenon that
the Irish government encouraged with yet more tax incentives.
Some small seaside towns sprouted tax incentive-generated
"holiday homes."' 23 Visitors were appalled that the "green fields"
corporate tax policy across the EU).
118 See Byoung-Inn Bai, supra note 23 (alluding to disapproval of Eastern Europe
following Irish tax policies).
119 See, INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE IRISH ECONOMY (Alan Gray ed.,
1997) (This collection of essays that appeared during the early period of the Irish boom
years featured a number of analyses by prestigious international economists about
Ireland's success in the 1990s).
120 Ireland's failure to comply with EU environmental laws has been notorious.
Labour MEP for Dublin, Proinsias DeRossa, has been scathing in his criticism of
successive Irish governments on this score. See, e.g., De Rossa Slams Government's
Environmental Record Following Announcement of Eight Separate Challenges over
Breaches ofEU Law, DEROSSA.COM (Jan. 13, 2005),
http://www.derossa.com/showPage.php?ID=716 ("During the period [1997-2002], with
just one percent of the EU population, Ireland was responsible for 16% of all first
warnings [by the European Commission on environmental matters] while Ireland
received twice as many first warnings than France, a country with over ten times our
population.") See also Frank McDonald, Ireland's Ecological Breaches High, Says
DeRossa, IRISH TIMES, June 2, 2009, at 8 (quoting DeRossa to the effect that
"'conservative political forces' in Ireland viewed environmental protection as one of the
negative 'obligations' of EU membership-measures that should be opposed and, when
that proves futile, to be delayed for as long as possible").
121 MCDONALD & Nix, supra note 25, at 33.
122 Having let its language languish more than a hundred years ago, Ireland also
experienced a rapid loss of landscape in the 1990s. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 178.
123 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 116.
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were being used for tasteless buildings of all kinds. 124  Such
policies were pursued even while remaining pockets of cultural
and linguistic viability were being undermined. 125  Rather than
follow a model of vibrant small business and niche farming, for
instance, the Irish followed a "get-rich-quick" approach to
development that proved unsustainable over the long term. 126
In April 2009, Mario Monti, formerly European Commissioner
for the single market, tax policy and competition, ironically
grouped Ireland together with the "Anglo-Saxon" economies of
Britain and the United States, as distinct from the "social market"
countries of the EU-France, Germany and other states committed
to "social objectives."l27 Monti suggested that the global
economic crisis provided the perfect opportunity to reconcile the
competing visions of the Anglo-Saxons as against the Continental
social marketeers, through the long overdue coordination of tax
regimes.128 Monti suggested that this was the only way to preserve
the European market economy.129
It is striking that in its "boom phase," the Irish economy was
referred to as the "Celtic" tiger, attributing its economic prowess
There were incentives for the developers of hotels and holiday camps, of private
hospitals and nursing homes, of holiday cottage schemes, of third-level
educational buildings and student accommodation blocks, of childcare and park-
and-ride facilities, of multi-story car parks and refurbished flats. Most of this
was stark stupidity: the number of hotel rooms, for example, increased by 150
percent in the Celtic Tiger years, while the number of tourists increased by 70
percent.
Id. at 116.
124 See id. at 116-20.
125 See Id.
126 There have, of course, been some analyses of Ireland's peculiar position vis a vis
the EU and the larger trends of global capitalism. Michael J. O'Sullivan has pointed out
that Ireland's embrace of globalization has placed it in the "Anglo-Saxon" camp. See
MICHAEL J. O'SULLIVAN, IRELAND AND THE GLOBAL QUESTION 7 (2006) (". . . [T]here is
a growing strain between Ireland's role as a modem European nation and its increasing
adoption of Anglo-Saxon political, economic and cultural norms. Globalisation, which
is largely Anglo-Saxon in nature, has contributed to this."). O'Sullivan points out that
between 2002 and 2004, Ireland was internationally ranked as the "most globalised
country." Id. at 34.
127 See Andrew Willis, Economic Guru Calls for Tax Harmonization to Save Single
Market, EU OBSERVER (May 14, 2009), http://euobserver.com/9/28129.
128 See Id.
129 See Id.
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to Ireland's latent Celtic (i.e., non-Anglo-Saxon) characteristics.' 3 0
Whether or not the Tiger's proponents thought of it in this way,
the use of the phrase Celtic Tiger implied (albeit tongue in cheek)
a reawakening of the long-suffering Celtic beast, whose
distinctiveness had, to a large extent, faded under centuries of
British oppression.'"' From a certain point of view, the Celtic
Tiger was allowed to flourish by virtue of the largesse of the
Continental Europeans.13 2 In Monti's 2009 formulation, however,
the Celtic Tiger had reverted to a pre-existing "Anglo-Saxon"
group membership, the selfish aspects of which had eclipsed the
more positive "Celtic" image.'3 3
It is unclear how Ireland might survive a return to the margins
of Europe. It could be argued that the EU had a responsibility to
understand the degree to which Ireland had made itself dependent
on the low-tax device and, in turn, the degree to which that was
incompatible with good faith EU membership. It was likely the
case that, just as the EU served Ireland's needs, portrayal of
Ireland as a role model for small and underdeveloped states
achieving success via EU membership also served the EU's
needs.'34 This led to a prolonged state of mutual denial, allowing
the inherent contradiction to develop unchecked.
130 The notion of a "Celtic tiger," of course, grew out of a comparison between
Ireland's newly successful economy and those of certain Southeast and East Asian
nations that had been dubbed the "Asian tigers." See generally Denis O'Hearn,
Comparative Tigerhood, in INSIDE THE CELTIC TIGER 1-32 (1998) (critiquing this false
comparison).
131 The Celtic Tiger reawakened decades after Ireland broke free from British
power. See supra note 96.
132 See infra Part V.C (discussing role of cohesion funds).
133 See Willis, supra note 127 (discussing 2009 formulation).
134 An ordinary internet search finds a wide variety of references to Ireland (at least
before the 2009 economic collapse) as the role model for small states within the EU; it
was praised for having used its EU membership to great, even amazing, advantage.
Virtually none of these references take into account Ireland's over-reliance on tax policy
to achieve development. See, e.g., Brian O'Mahony, Take a Bow for Role Model
Behaviour, IRISH EXAMINER (Sept. 24, 2005),
http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2005/09/24/story694531505.asp.
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IV. Manufacturing Happiness for U.S. Multinationals
A. Irish Objectives, European Discourse
From the first, and in each successive instance of European
enlargement, the EU, moving in the direction of some ultimate
political union, has collided with national political themes and
tendencies. The original objective of the EEC was to render war
involving Germany and France obsolete as an option.' The EU
approach to institutional reform, while painfully slow, has had a
consistent purpose when viewed over time."' Continental
European countries, perhaps better disposed to grasp the
techniques and even virtues of empire building than the so-called
peripheral countries, have undoubtedly seen their own
transcendent historical goals reflected in the EU itself. 17 The road
to the "ultimate" would thus, from their perspectives, have to be
more than simply the orchestration of national interests.' As one
moves away from Central Europe, this philosophy appears to be
less operative." 9
In the case of Britain and Ireland, the two inextricably linked
"island nations," what they have found and how they have
performed in the EU, is far more idiosyncratic and less
conceptually integrated than the Continental states.14 0 In the case
of Britain, a sense of European exceptionalism meant that the
political focus would remain on the Commonwealth, the alliance
with the United States, and on the importance of remaining
separate from European threats to its (non-negotiable) identity.14 '
Ireland, always in the British shadow, contains contradictory
elements of dependence upon and resistance to outside influence.
Many watching Ireland during its early years of participation
135 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty,
EuRoPA: SUMMARIES ON EU LEGISLATION,
http://europa.eu/1egislation-sunimaries/institutionalaffairs/treaties/treaties-eec-en.htm
(last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
136 Fischer, supra note 69.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id. It remains to be seen how the new entrants of 2004 and 2006-Poland,
for instance- will fit into this conception.
140 E.g. British nonintegrated monetary system and Irish tax manipulation.
141 See generally, JACOBSEN, supra note 2, at Ch.7.
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in the EEC might not have grasped the essential reality that its
apparently pro-European position was a manifestation of the Irish
tendency to passivity, outward imitation, and a determination to
climb out of the British shadow by playing in a bigger league.142
Certainly Irish membership came with expectations of national
"performance" and ultimate success.14 3  Vast wealth transfers
between continental Europe and the Irish took place as a matter of
course; the countryside was transformed by roads, and the creaky
machinery of the Irish state was modernized.'" Yet, reflecting its
tradition of colonized thinking and policy-making, the Irish chose
the easiest route to prosperity: providing U.S. multinational
corporations with tax savings and the opportunity to sell their
goods in the European market.145  As explained above, the Irish
achieved a parallel feat in the realm of global capital by creating a
"Financial Services Centre" that provided tax evasion
opportunities for thousands of (mainly paper) global companies, in
addition to the U.S. companies carrying on business out of
Ireland.146  Fortunately for Ireland, the Continental antipathy
towards the British placed Ireland in exactly the right place to take
advantage of a European psychodrama. 147 Britain, with its
retrograde view of Europe and prioritizing of the transatlantic
alliance, was often unpopular in Brussels.148 While Tony Blair had
a transformative effect on that relationship after his election in
1997, his embrace of George Bush's Iraqi ambitions beginning in
2003 returned the UK-European relationship to its prior reality:
Continental frustration that Britain would probably never sign on
142 See O'TOLE, supra note 20, at 171-72 ("The EU had been a crucial part of Irish
identity between the 1970s and 1990s when it had been the form in which Irish
modernity sold itself to a rural and conservative population. It has, paradoxically,
vindicated Irish nationalism by finally breaking the dependence of the Irish economy on
trade with Britain").
143 See LAFFAN & O'MAHONY, supra note 30, at Ch.7.
144 See Morrow, supra note 109 (discussing roadways and funding).
145 See Killian, supra note 3.
146 See, O'ToLE, supra note 20, at 126-27, 129-30 (describing how the IFSC, brain
child of Prime Minister Charles Haughey, became a center for "high-level financial
juggling by American-owned transnational corporations, with their Dutch-based
treasury-management subsidiaries routing capital flows through Dublin").
147 See O'TooLE, supra note 20, at 170-71.
148 See generally, JACOBSEN, supra note 2.
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to the "ultimate" vision of a politically unified EU.14 9 From the
1970s onward, the EU accepted the role of liberating Ireland from
its dependence on Britain.'"0 Ireland was now the Good European,
in contrast to British ambivalence."' Ireland could be competent,
without British assistance. 5 2  Ireland had become one of a
uniquely powerful grouping of nations.
Ironically, as noted above, the Irish method of achieving the
appropriate level of prosperity had remained utterly dependent in
methodology.' 53 To a remarkable extent, the Irish economy
became dependent upon the Irish being allowed to engage in
unfair tax competition, using its position within the European
market, and simultaneously providing extremely generous tax
relief to U.S. multinational corporations.'" This required Ireland
to develop some defensive explanatory narratives, and in a great
hurry.15 5  It attributed its own success to "productivity,"
"technology," and targeted educational policies, to name a few.'5 6
Enjoying a political invisibility due to its small size, and coddled
because of its vexed historical relationship with Britain, Ireland sat
back and experienced itself being washed over with enormous
149 Id.
150 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 171-72 (indicating that Ireland used the
European Union to get out from under the British shadow); id. at 97-101 (describing how
the Irish property boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s was fueled by resentment
against years of enforced underdevelopment and British oppression).
151 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 170.
152 Id. at 171-72.
153 See Somerville, supra note 4.
'54 Id.
155 See generally RARY MAC SHERRY& PADRAIC WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE
CELTIC TIGER 205 (Mercier Press) (2000) (considered to be one of the Bibles of Irish
economic thinking).
156 But see O'SULLIVAN, supra note 126, at 63.
[W]ider access to education seems to have created an illusion of deeper and
better education. Though the Irish education system and the skills it has
imparted to the Irish labour force are almost always invoked to explain the
attractiveness of Ireland as an investment location, Irish governments over the
last thirty years have spent little more per capita than the European average....
[T]he 2005 OECD statistical profile of Ireland showed that spending on pre-
primary, primary and secondary education in Ireland was low compared to
OECD and European levels.
Id at 63.
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waves of global capital.'
Despite its apparent loyalty to the European ideal, the
European ideal never actually penetrated the Irish
consciousness.15 8  European political unity had no obvious
meaning within the Irish historical memory.'59 The concepts of
obligation and cooperation, both explicitly and inherently present
in the EU's treaties, were psychologically cost-free for the Irish, as
Ireland had a long established tradition of seeming to bow to
outside authority, while hoping to make the best of a dependent
situation.' Apparent adherence to ideas of solidarity with the
Third World during the 1970s gave way to mastery of the
language of international "competition" and European
constitutionalism.''
In recent years, the formerly unmentionable began to be
articulated. In June 2007, the German Finance Minister finally
stated quite bluntly that it made no sense for Ireland to take huge
amounts of money from the EU to finance infrastructural
development, while at the same time inviting in U.S. industries,
which are competitors of European companies, to avail themselves
of Ireland's ultra-low corporate tax rates.162 Ireland had, for many
years, been helping U.S. companies to avoid paying their rightful
U.S. taxes, while also expecting the Continental Europeans to
subsidize Irish public service needs. 6 1 In the process, Ireland had,
157 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1074.
159 O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 41 (describing the dominant ethos in Irish political
culture as one where business elites provided financial assistance to politicians because
of a perceived need to remain on the "inside track").
159 Id. at 45 (explaining that the pay-to-play perception "tilted relations between
money and politics, business and the state away from the general public interest and
towards a search for mutual benefits in which politicians got access to the money and
business people got access to the politicians").
160 See LAFFAN & O'MAHONY, supra note 30, at 1074.
161 See generally ELIZABETH KEANE, AN IRISH STATESMAN AND REVOLUTIONARY:
THE NATIONALIST AND INTERNATIONALIST POLITICS OF SEAN MACBRIDE 185-86 (2006)
(noting that Sean MacBride, hero of Irish nationalism and an international human rights
campaigner, was the embodiment of the progressive egalitarianism of the 1960s and
1970s).
162 Irish Corporate Tax Regime and Synthetic Indignation, FINFACTS IRELAND BLOG
(June 6, 2007), http://www.fmfacts.ie/finfactsblog/2007/06/irish-corporate-tax-regime-
and.html.
163 See Blue, supra note 7, at 465.
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as previously noted, been the recipient of a very high proportion of
total U.S. direct investment in Europe.'" Ireland and the
international economic think tanks billed Ireland as the most
"efficient," well organized, business friendly environment, having
turned itself around from the economic backwater that it
traditionally was."' Ireland was even dubbed the most
"globalized" economy in the world. 66
Yet there was no mystery about what the Irish did. They read
the rather transparent wishes of multinational corporations, which
have two main operational goals: savings on tax and labor costs.
It is true that there is a certain set of preconditions to inward
investment: reasonable levels of infrastructure, a reasonably well-
educated population, and a reasonable level of public services. 167
But Ireland performed only one key service: it assured
multinational companies that it would help them save on their tax
bill.16 8 It accomplished this with an impressive tenacity. Ireland
showed little concern about the implications for its role as a
cooperative member of the European Union and offered no
apologies for how this tax avoidance role squared with traditional
Irish "solidarity" with the international working class.169 Given its
small size, Ireland's economic, cultural, and physical landscapes
were rapidly altered.o
Belatedly, the European Union began to consider concrete
steps towards creating uniform standards for calculating corporate
taxes throughout the EU.'7 ' As tax has been Ireland's sole
economic strategy for more than fifteen years, Ireland has
understandably continued to fight European tax coordination with
164 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1074.
165 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 126.
166 Id.
167 See Hanafin Rules Out Increase in State's Corporation Tax Rate, IRISH TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2010),
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/1002/breaking6.html [hereinafter
Hanafin].
168 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which
Ireland has provided low taxes to U.S. corporations).
169 See Collins, supra note 93.
170 See Coulter, supra note 2, at 16.
171 See Lambert, supra note 117.
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determination.17 2  In June 2007, the EU's tax commissioner,
Laszlo Kovacs of Hungary, finally stated the obvious when he
accused the internal market commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, of
pursuing the Irish national interest rather than the EU's interest. 73
Commissioner Kovacs' statement was perfectly true, and
McCreevy's approach was completely predictable. In many non-
tax related areas of concern, Ireland seemed to display
supranational competence and was able to present itself as a "good
European."l74 In part because of the Continental distrust of the
Britain, Ireland was seen as a team player in Europe, one that
deserved to be rewarded in light of its difficult history."' But on
the tax issue, Ireland had always been out for itself, and it showed
little concern for American development objectives that might not
be funded because of tax avoidance by Microsoft and Google.'7 1
Ironically, outgoing Commissioner McCreevy exacted some
revenge in a public statement in which he denounced the
supposedly partisan, nationalistic approach taken by the French
towards the French representative on the European Commission. 7
172 See sources cited supra note 56.
173 See Lucia Kubosova, Kovacs: EU Commissioners Should Not Act as National
Ministers, EUOBSERVER.COM (June 7, 2007), http://euobserver.com/9/24211 (quoting
EU tax commissioner Kovacs as stating that "Mr. McCreevy is no longer the minister of
finance of Ireland . . . he is [a] member of the European Commission who should
represent the community interests.").
174 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 170.
175 See id. at 170-71.
176 As previously noted in this article, the U.S. is losing billions of dollars in taxes
because of Ireland's welcoming environment. See Hearne, supra note 39. See also
Microsoft is Still Massively Evading Tax, Insider Trading Revisited, TECHRIGHTS (May
2, 2009), http://techrights.org/2009/05/02/microsoft-evading-tax-ireland/; John Collins,
Profits at Google Subsidiary in Ireland up at Almost Five-Fold, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 21,
2010), available at
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2010/0921/1224279369637.html.
177 See Andrew Willis, Irish Commissioner Critical of Sarkozy, EUOBSERVER.COM
(Dec. 20, 2009), http://euobserver.com/9/29183. EU commissioner for internal market
affairs, Charlie McCreevy, reacted to France having lobbied, and received, the internal
market portfolio for one of its own nationals in the newly-formed European
Commission. Id. Sarkozy had trumpeted this as "a defeat for Anglo-Saxon capitalism."
Id. McCreevy is reported as saying that "President Sarkozy has laid to rest once and for
all the myth that EU commissioners, certainly French ones, when they go to Brussels, are
expected to leave aside their home member state national interest and political priorities
and act exclusively in the community interest." Id.
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On the occasion mentioned above, Commissioner Kovacs
stated that "when I'm speaking for the harmonisation of the tax
base I'm not representing Hungarian interest but the Community
interest. Mr. McCreevy is representing the national interest of
Ireland."' 7  Mr. Kovacs pointedly implied that the Commission
had finally caught on to the motives of Ireland: "[I]t is the Council
[the body representative of Member State interests within the EU
structure] where national interest is to be represented by the
ministry of finance. Mr. McCreevy is no longer the minister of
finance of Ireland. He used to be but now he is [a] member of
[the] European Commission who should represent the community
interests."l7 9 But McCreevy, typical of mainstream Irish
politicians, likely never had any intention of working for the
Community interest.' 0 The fact that German taxpayers had
subsidized poorer regions for years in the name of a higher
European ideal was not an issue that Irish politicians had
acknowledged."' The degree to which Ireland was not thinking
according to any EU level ideal must have come as something of a
surprise to those who had not realized this before.
Ireland likewise expressed no concern for European businesses
that might be harmed by Ireland's pandering to U.S. companies.182
Ireland has provided a strident defense of the view that Ireland
178 Kubosova, supra note 173.
179 Id.
180 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 23 (describing the political career of Charlie
McCreevy and his efforts to "preserve the deep inequalities in Irish society" by
redistributing income upwards and providing tax cuts that most benefited individuals
with higher incomes). See also LAFFAN & O'MAHONY, supra note 30, at 32 ("Irish
policy was dominated by the desire to maximize receipts from [European Community]
funds, while minimizing the amount of interference in domestic policy and seeking
derogations on difficult parts."). See generally Jason Gorringe, Ireland Prepares
Defenses Against European Tax Harmonization, TAX-NEWS.COM (April 26, 2007),
http://www.tax-news.com/news/IrelandPrepares Defences AgainstEuropeanTax
Harmonisation 27087.html (noting opposition from Irish politicians and business
leaders to efforts to harmonize and bring transparency to corporate tax rates across the
EU).
181 See Spinning the German Contribution, PREssEUROP.EU (Oct. 12, 2009),
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/news-brief-cover/1 14321-spinning-german-
contribution (noting that Germany's net contribution is 8.8 billion euros, and that its
financial contribution continues to increase while other countries' burdens decrease).
182 See Collins, supra note 93.
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was an "attractive location" for U.S. business on many fronts, with
a well-educated, English-speaking workforce, bountiful water, and
temperate climate.' But the ultimate necessary precondition for
the U.S. investment was the tax regime. 8 4  Had the tax rate
increased to any significant degree, the U.S. companies would not
have remained.' Irish politicians themselves knew this, as their
country went from one of the poorest in Europe to one of the
richest in the world, its countryside altered beyond recognition,
and its traditional culture greatly weakened.'
V. Historical Baggage
A. The Irish State as a General Disappointment
Ireland's national identity has been formed around the twin
notions of victimization and dispossession. Faced with the
superior technical and political organization of the English, the
ancient Celtic culture of Ireland began to slip away as early as the
14th century.'87 Over time, the British carved up Irish territory into
estates, leading directly to the creation of the culturally familiar
Irish peasant of the 19 century, living in his stone cottage by his
few pigs and cattle, living off the nutrients found in potatoes, and
endlessly plotting revenge against the British master.'
The Great Famine of the 1840s cut the 19th century in half, and
is responsible for the general loss of language and cultural
cohesion that had managed to survive British domination. 8 9 Irish
as a living language of everyday commerce retreated from most
parts of the country.' With the combined effects of death by
starvation, disease, and mass emigration, the Irish population was
183 The sole purpose of the Industrial Development Agency is to promote foreign
business investment in Ireland. See Foreign Investment, supra note 115.
184 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1074.
185 See Hanafin Rules Out Increase in State's Corporation Tax Rate, supra note 167.
186 See O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 26-45.
187 See J.F. Lydon, The Medieval English Colony: 13th and 14th Centuries, in THE
COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY 113-16 (T.W. Moody & F.X. Martin eds., 4th ed. 2001)
(noting that the English influence in the "feudalized part of Ireland" brought "a great
period of expansion and development in every sphere of [Irish] life").
188 See, JACKSON, supra note 28, at Ch.3.
189 See id. at 84.
190 Id.
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diminished by more than twenty percent.'91 This tragic event,
which continues to be a point of interest today, was a cultural
trauma of the highest order. This sense of loss and failure was
carried out across a massive Irish diaspora, to be recounted and
dwelt upon across generations. 19 2  Within Ireland, agitation for
land reform continued,"' and, while many might have been
content with some form of home rule, Ireland eventually gained
independence for twenty-six of its thirty-two counties.19 4
Ireland has been a thorn in the side of Britain's own heroic
narrative. The murderous Black and Tan special forces, active
during the war of Irish independence in the 1920s, used the most
repressive tactics in an attempt to root out Irish nationalists.9 9
Even in recent times, Britain has been forced to mediate in a
conflict of its own historical making in Northern Ireland.196 For
decades, at least until the Catholic-Protestant peace agreements of
the 1990s, Britain had to deal with a long-running cultural and
religious battle on its doorstep.'9 7 Irish people around the world
have created one of the most broadly dispersed diasporas of any
nation.'98 Throughout the long period of direct British influence in
Ireland, economic dependency was not surprisingly the dominant
mode of thinking among the general population.'99 Livelihood
was often connected to public works "schemes," such as wall
building.20 0
191 See generally David Fitzpatrick, Flight from Famine, in THE GREAT IRISH
FAMINE 174-84 (Cathal P6irtir ed., 1995) (noting the effects the famine in Ireland had
on emigration from the country and the resulting population loss following that time);
Keven Whelan, Pre and Post-Famine Landscape Change, in THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE,
19-33 (discussing the history of the potato in Ireland).
192 See id.
193 See id. at Ch.3. (Land Question).
194 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 212.
195 See ARTHUR MARWICK, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN BRITISH ISLES, 1914-1999
74-80 (2000).
196 Ireland Timeline, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/1038669.stm (last updated Oct. 9, 2010) (briefly
addressing the agreements and negotiations between Ireland and Britain over the past
hundred years).
197 See id.
198 See JAMES S. DONNELLY, THE GREAT IRISH POTATO FAMINE 9 (2001).
199 See Telzer, supra note 8.
200 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 74.
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After independence was attained, the new Irish state was
hardly the "nation" imagined by those who had fought for
independence from the nineteenth century onwards. In stark
contrast to the vision of thinkers like Padraig Pearse and Michael
Collins, Ireland did little to maintain and revive the national
language, despite its featured role in the Irish Constitution. 2 0' The
principal means of giving honor to the slowly dying language was
to link it to obtaining secondary school diplomas and to finding
employment in the public sector.202 Compared to other parts of
Europe where speakers of minority languages did not even enjoy
the advantage of having a state of their own-the Catalans,
Basques, and Welsh, to name only a few examples-the Irish
failed in an obvious way to bring the Irish language into the
mainstream of national life.203
Although the Irish political party system was based on
alliances in the Irish Civil War of the 1920s, in fact the
administrative imagination of the new Irish state was, as described
201 Michael Collins and other nationalists and revolutionaries consistently made the
point that loss of the national language had caused degradation in public life in Ireland
and that part of the restoration of the country must include restoration of the language to
a central place in everyday communication. See Michael Collins, Distinctive Culture;
Ancient Irish Civilisation, in THE PATH TO FREEDOM 95-105 (2006) (glorifying the
"Gaelic past" and imagining a non-commercial, highly spiritual Ireland that could be
reconstructed through the promotion of the Irish language, among other efforts). Collins
wrote that "English civilization, while it may suit the English people, could only be alien
to us . . . For us, it is a misfit. It is a garment, not something within us. We are mean,
clumsy, and ungraceful, wearing it. It exposes all our defects while giving us no scope
to display our good qualities." Id. at 98. Collins urged that "The biggest task will be the
restoration of the language. How can we express our most subtle thoughts and finest
feelings in a foreign tongue? Irish will scarcely be our language in this generation, not
even perhaps in the next. But until we have it again on our tongues and in our minds we
are not free, and we will produce no immortal literature." Id. at 102.
202 See id.
203 Compare Irish and Non-Irish Speakers in Each Province at Each Census Since
1861, CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
http://www.cso.ie/statistics/irishspeakerssincel861.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010)
(notably the 2002 census that found that there are almost twice as many non-Irish
speakers as Irish speakers), with Ireland Speaks Up Loudly for Gaelic, NYTIMES.COM,
March 29, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/28/world/europe/28iht-irish.html (reporting that less
than 1% of parliamentary debates occurred in Gaelic, indicating a general lack of
fluency).
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above, simply a pale reflection of the British version.2 04 Of course,
the Catholic Church and Catholic dogma generally enjoyed a high
level of power and authority, but with respect to overall
governmental organization and design, the British model was
unmistakably dominant.20 5  The delegation of many important
governmental tasks to local authorities, for instance, was based on
the British administrative model.206
Having an independent state of its own did little to stop the
tide of Irish emigration from the 1920s onward. 207 The 1950s were
economically stagnant. 208 Throughout the heady 1960s and 1970s,
during which the great colonial powers let go of their possessions
in the developing world, Ireland took on the role of champion for
the poor and oppressed, presenting itself as a bridge between the
developed and developing world.209  The great political figure
Sean MacBride stands for this image of Ireland as victim and
moralizer, set apart from the European mainstream, proud of its
heritage as the home of a colonized people on the edge of
Europe. 210  Having been a nationalist fighter, a member of
204 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 275. Ireland set itself up with the same
Parliamentary structure as Britain after the War of Independence. Id.
205 See id. at 310.
206 See id.
207 Joellen Perry, Economic Crisis Strikes at Irish Heartland, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27,
2009, at All ("Emigration continued after Ireland won independence from Britain in
1921; more people left the country than came to it every decade until a 1970s economic
revival stemmed the tide. But double-digit unemployment pushed people abroad again
in the 1980s."). The article also notes that people are now leaving Ireland in search of
better work environments. Id.
208 See J.J. Sexton, Employment, Unemployment and Emigration, in IRELAND IN
TRANSITION 31 (Kieran A. Kennedy ed., 1986) (describing the 1950s as "one of the
lowest points in the recent fortunes" of Ireland with "a net population loss of some
400,000-almost one person in eight").
209 In a 2006 press release, Irish politician Dermot Ahern said this "marks a radical
new vision of Ireland as bridge between the developed and developing world." Dermot
Ahem, Speech: Launch of White Paper (Sept. 18, 2006), transcript available at
http://www.irishaid.gov.ie/whitepaper/assets/Minister/20for/ 2OForeign%20Affairs%2
Ospeech%20White%20Paper%20launch.doc.
210 See WILLIAM G. HARLEY, CREATIVE COMPROMISE: THE MACBRIDE COMMISSION
33 (1993) (describing Sean MacBride as coming "literally from fighting Irish stock").
Not only had MacBride been imprisoned in the name of Irish freedom, but went on to
champion international human rights at the highest levels. Id. at 33-34.
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government, and an international statesman,2 11 MacBride
symbolized an Irish political identity that was empathetic and
egalitarian, in part because of its perceived resistance to the
interests of the British Empire.2 12
At the time, few would have considered the Irish international
political stance to be essentially superficial, and merely reflective
of the fact that Ireland had not been able to succeed at providing
material prosperity for its citizens.213  A continued focus on
historical victimization was more comfortable than a rigorous
examination of the fact that, despite advantages of location and
climate, Ireland had not managed to produce anything of
substantial interest to a regional, let alone international, market.2 14
Prior to entry into the EEC, and indeed long after as well, Ireland
traded off its image as a charming and sincere nation of people
with a lively culture intact in its cities and rural locations. 2 15 To
that extent, tourism became a principal industry, aided by the
nearly endless supply of interested and well disposed visitors from
the four corners of the Irish diaspora.2 16
B. EEC Membership: The Greatest Scheme ofAll
As explained above, the roots of the EEC were, despite the
technocratic packaging, intensely political and idealistic.2 17 In
their own way, the founders of the EEC were as quietly passionate
about their cause as any revolutionary acting in the service of a
political concept, despite the self-imposed limitations of a
gradualist and technocratic approach to the "project.""' It is well
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 See LAFFAN & O'MAHONY, supra note 30, at 31-55.
215 Discover Ireland, a government website promoting tourism has a decidedly
market oriented approach to the country providing "strategic and practical support to
develop and sustain Ireland as a high-quality and competitive tourist destination."
Developing Ireland as a tourist destination is an important business enterprise. Official
Irish Tourism Website, http://www.discoverireland.ie/Home.aspx (last visited Oct. 27,
2010).
216 Id.
217 Fischer, supra note 69.
218 In his famous Declaration of May 9, 1950, the French Foreign Minister,
declaring what would become the dominant and consistent methodology of the EU,
wrote the following: "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan.
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established that the goal of the founders was to bring about a
political union that would make war unthinkable and restrain
excessive nationalism, over time and through a process of legal
and technical accretion.2 1 9 For the Irish Republic, having
essentially sat out of World War II, this goal can hardly be
expected to have had a galvanizing political or psychological
effect. The rationale put forward by the Irish elites for entering
the EEC was predictable: the British were going to join up, and
Irish farmers could become wealthy through the Common
Agricultural Policy.2 20 There is little evidence of the Irish taking
on a sense of European mission upon entry.2 2 ' Even compared to
the recent entrants from Eastern Europe, who have been motivated
by a wish to flee a history of Soviet domination, the Irish approach
was strikingly practical and separated from the true source of Irish
political passion, which remained nationalistic, or more accurately,
inwardly-focused.2 22 Indeed, the resistance to participation, both
then and now, is largely from nationalists, who reject the
imposition of a false set of motivations onto the Irish state
apparatus.2 2 3 Ironically, Irish nationalists, even economically
It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity."
See Declaration of 9 May 1950, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-
may/declen.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). The Minister refers to the plan to unite the
French and German coal and steel industries as a "proposal [that] will lead to the
realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensible to the
preservation of peace." Id.
219 Fischer, supra note 69.
220 The EU in Ireland, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/ireland-in-theeu/indexlen.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
221 See Killian, supra note 3, at 1075.
222 See Walsh, supra note 90, at 207-28.
223 One of the most prominent Irish euroskeptic groups is the National Platform,
headed by the ubiquitous Anthony Coughlan. See generally THENATIONAL PLATFORMEU
RESEARCH AND INFORMATION CENTRE, http://www.nationalplatform.org/ (last visited Oct.
27, 2010). The group mantra ("For a Europe of Independent Democratic Co-Operating
Nation States") is unremittingly hostile to the EU on the grounds of its supposed lack of
democracy. Id. The group's underlying philosophy is a revealing combination of old-
time nationalism, cultural particularism and, ironically, strident support for Ireland's
policy of reliance on U.S. multinational investment. Id. An example of this is seen in
the group's analysis of the potential dangers of the Lisbon treaty. The Lisbon Treaty
Amendment on EU Harmonized Taxes, WISE UP JOURNAL (Apr. 18, 2004),
http://www.wiseupjournal.com/?p=270. The analysis notes that Article 279 of the
Lisbon Treaty amendments, inserting the phrase "and to avoid distortion of competition"
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leftist ones, see no contradiction in Irish reliance on U.S.
multinational investment.2 2 4  In fact, many now see their
opposition to the EU in terms of the need to protect and preserve
Irish tax autonomy, which is code for continuing U.S.
multinational investment.22 5
Membership in the EEC did allow the Irish to explore a long
overdue independence from British economic domination. For the
first time in hundreds of years, economic survival did not depend
on the British,2 26 and indeed a surer road to prosperity lay in
acting the part of the Euro-enthusiast to contrast with British
antipathy towards European political union. The British
understood and rejected European political (as opposed to a more
limited economic) union.2 7 The Irish assumed European political
union would not bother them one way or the other, and simply
tuned out that political philosophy as if background music in a
language they did not speak.2 28
It may be surmised that the Continentals believed that Ireland
was more profoundly touched and inspired by the European
project than was the case. It is certain that Irish elites, and even
ordinary people, quickly saw the potential for profiting from EEC
membership. 229 Although it took a certain amount of time, it is
possible to interpret Irish strategic behavior from the 1970s on as
the grasping of a unique historical opportunity to achieve what had
eluded the Irish for so long: material success. 2 30  It is not
surprising, then, that the MacBridean theory of Ireland as a friend
and fellow traveler of the downtrodden,2 3 1 while still part of the
into the full amended Article 113, would allow the European Court of Justice to decide
that Ireland's lower rate of corporation tax as compared to the higher rates of other EU
members is a "distortion of competition." Id.
224 See id.
225 Norton, supra note 2, at 206.
226 Norton, supra note 2, at 213-16.
227 See Lenaerts, supra note 76, at 479; Attitudes, supra note 68. Together these
sources show that the UK is understood to be set apart from the rest of the EU.
228 See Norton, supra note 2, at 213-16.
229 See McLean, supra note 70.
230 Norton, supra note 2, at 206-16.
231 See HARLEY, supra note 210, at 33-34. See generally KEANE, supra note 161, at
185-86 (exploring the politics and policies of Sean MacBride with a focus on his impact
on Irish foreign policy).
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political and psychological makeup of the country, was soft
pedaled on the world and European stage.
Ireland, constantly emptied out of its population through
emigration, was at the time of EEC entry a far less populous
country than it would have been under more ordinary
developmental circumstances. 232  The economic effect of EEC
membership on the country as a whole was electric. The number
of farmers decreased at an alarming rate, but those who survived
were greatly enriched by participation in the Common Agricultural
Policy. 233 Not surprisingly, Irish-owned businesses disappeared as
competition with superior European goods was overwhelming.2 34
Despite some anemic attempts to support a "Buy Irish" campaign,
no Irish government and no mainstream political party made a
serious argument to the effect that Ireland could attain prosperity
by a go-it-alone policy. 235
Ireland soon became the spoiled child of Europe. Easy to love,
small and remote, and long oppressed by the British, the EEC
essentially allowed Ireland to game the system. A similar
fondness and lack of understanding from the American side
allowed Ireland to serve as a tax avoidance vehicle for American
companies, beginning in earnest in the 1990s. 236  It has been
suggested above that the great seriousness of purpose of the EU as
232 Brendan Walsh, Economic Growth and Development, 1945-70, in IRELAND
1945-1970, 27, 28-29 (Joe Lee ed., 1979) (Ireland had a population of 2.8 million when
it entered the EEC in 1961, which is five percent less than when Ireland gained
independence in 1921).
233 The Common Agricultural Policy heavily subsidizes farmers in the European.
See Secondo Tarditi and George Zanias, Common Agricultural Policy, in
COMPETITIVENESS AND COHESION IN EU POLICIES 179 (Ronald All, Alasdair Smith and
Loukas Tsoukalis eds., 2001) (examining the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy
on agricultural income in the EU). See generally The European Union's policy website
on agriculture,
http://europa.eu/pol/agr/indexen.htm (elaborating on EU agricultural subsidies) (last
visited Oct. 27, 2010).
234 See JACOBSEN, supra note 2, at 112 ("Over 1971-74, 58,500 jobs were created in
IDA sponsored [that is, multinational-derived] industries, but 53,000 jobs were lost in
the old manufacturing sector - a quarter of all manufacturing jobs."); see also id. at 151
("[F]ew [Irish] firms had adjusted to competitive conditions [within the EEC].").
235 Blue, supra note 7, at 459-63.
236 Norton, supra note 2, at 200-06.
2010] 47
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXVI
a "project" was never internalized by the Irish,2 37 perhaps for the
simple and obvious reason that history did not appear to the Irish
imagination in a genuinely European way. The British had long
been considered "suspect" from a Continental perspective, and the
British lack of adherence to the European project was a cause of
consternation.23 Ireland, though, was small enough and
previously unsuccessful enough that this lack of political
connectedness was easy to overlook.2 39
C. Structural Funds and Headage Payments
In many ways, the worst thing that could have happened to
Ireland was the easy money that flowed into it to allow Ireland to
"catch up" with Europe in development terms.240 The advent of
structural and cohesion funds in Ireland confirmed the country's
sense of entitlement and victimization and further encouraged a
national tendency to seek historical justifications for Ireland's
economic passivity afid dependency-heretofore on Britain, but
increasingly a new dependency on the German taxpayer. 241' There
was little discussion about what was expected of Ireland, by way
of a new political consciousness, in return for these Continental
237 O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 26-45.
238 Former French President Charles DeGaulle opposed British entry into the EEC
on the ground that the British were focused on their own interests and would never be
good Europeans. BBC On This Day, 1967: De Gaulle Says 'Non' to Britain - Again,
BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/27/newsid_4187000/4187714.
stm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
239 O'SULLIVAN, supra note 126, at 80-82.
240 See Bailey & De Propris, supra note 49.
241 In a famous book written just before the "Celtic Tiger" years, author Cathal
Guiomard described what he calls an Irish disease that has prevented Ireland from
embracing economic and social dynamism. CATHAL GUIOMARD, THE IRISH DISEASE AND
How To CURE IT: COMMON-SENSE ECONOMICS FOR A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1995).
While his calls for productivity and competition appear particularly ironic from the
vantage point of 2009, Guiomard's description of the overriding problem in Irish
thinking is still of significance. Id. He writes that the obstacles to Irish success "go far
beyond questions of economic policy and right to the heart of [Irish] culture; they
include some of [Ireland's] old and cherished ways. To achieve economic and social
modernization, [Ireland] must, for instance, throw off [its] ruinous defeatism and
negativity, [its] anti-intellectualism, [its] tolerance of mediocrity, [its] inclination
towards dependency, and [its] never-ending demand for subsidies (from London, from
Dublin, from Brussels, from anywhere!)." Id. at 2.
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Ireland was now being offered an unprecedented opportunity
to develop and prosper. The problem was that Ireland had no
tradition of indigenous economic dynamism, and no expertise in
reading genuine market trends. 243  There was, however, a long
standing tradition of figuring out how to survive without reading
market trends, and the Irish state took this on with an unparalleled
determination. 2 " Without the EU funding that created a great
infrastructural boom, Ireland would not have been in a position to
invite in American industry.245  But with the help of EU
membership, Ireland soon set itself up as a tax avoidance
jurisdiction for American firms. 246 In the economic sense, Ireland
became more thoroughly American than it had been before, even
at the height of emigration to America. 247 At the level of political
discourse, Ireland was an enthusiastic proponent of the European
project (in which, as has been argued in this article, it had little
genuine interest). At the level of historical irony, Ireland became
the site of massive tax-based gifts to American firms selling their
wares into the European market in direct competition with
Continental firms. 248  Media and intellectual elites in Ireland
scarcely seemed to notice this contradictory state of affairs: it was
rarely, if ever, broached that there could be real damage to U.S.
society due to revenue foregone, or to the EU, as Ireland failed to
pull its own weight economically.24 9
When criticism did arise from various quarters, there were
242 See Bailey & De Propris, supra note 49.
243 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 126, at 75 (noting "Ireland has become a
production centre for foreign companies").
244 See id. at 82-83; see also id. at 75 ("[T]he weakness of the Irish 'miracle' . . . [is]
that somebody else (i.e., foreign multinationals and the European Central Bank) either
owns or controls the levers of the Irish economy, which is not really a desirable outcome
for a country that cherishes its independence").
245 See Blue, supra note 7, at 444-45, 454.
246 Tadhg O'Donoghue, A Guide to Irish Taxes, BusmEss AMERICA, March 22,
1993, at 14 (noting that Ireland's manufacturing tax dropped to ten percent in 1980).
247 O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 190 (During the Celtic Tiger years, Ireland "[was]
not Ireland any more but someplace else. [Irish culture] came up with a name for that
place: America").
248 See Moore, supra note 24, at 368-70.
249 See McLure, supra note 86.
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stock responses by Irish government representatives: first,
American high-tech companies were not, they said, in Ireland
solely or even primarily because of the tax situation.25 0 Ireland
had good, young workers, was English-speaking, and politically
stable.25 ' These were the elements of the official story.252 As to
the fact that the vast majority of Irish exports were the products of
multinational companies, that was said to be insignificant, as the
world had entered a globalizing phase, and the term "national
economy" no longer had any meaning.25 3 Most bizarre of all was
the Irish insistence that tax competition within Europe was "a
good thing."2 54 Indeed, argued the Irish government at the height
of the tax-driven success, Continental Europe would be well
advised to imitate the Irish and lower their own punishingly high
rates of corporate taxation.255  Those who espoused this view
appeared not to acknowledge that it was tax revenue, generated
within the larger EU Member States, that produced the funds that
allowed Europe to afford such programs as the Common
Agricultural Policy and structural and cohesion funding.
250 See Coulter, supra note 89, at 19.
The motives that informed these decisions [by US multinationals] to establish
branch plants in the twenty-six counties bore little resemblance to the formal
explanations offered at press conferences to mark their announcement. The
routine assurances of senior executives that their corporations were attracted to
the Irish Republic principally by the prospect of dealing with a highly educated
workforce have rarely managed to convince. The education system in the
twenty-six counties remains, after all, hugely under-funded and emerges poorly
out of international comparisons.
Id. at 19.
251 See IDA Ireland, IRELAND: WHERE ELSE?, available at
http://www.idaireland.com/news-media/publications/library-publications/ida-ireland-
publications/IDA Ireland General Brochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
252 Id.
253 See LAFFAN & O'MAHONY, supra note 30, at Ch.7.
254 Irish politicians have consistently made the argument for the supposed "benefits"
of tax competition. Gorringe, supra note 180. Irish political insider, former Senator, and
then MEP, Eoin Ryan, argued in the European Parliament against moves to coordinate
tax rates in Europe. Id. Ryan stated that "[tiax competition is healthy for the economic
development of the European Union. It provides a clear incentive to European
Governments to manage their public finances carefully and to build a corporate tax
regime that encourages enterprise." Id.
255 See SwEENEY, supra note 83.
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D. Effects on the Holy Ground: Cultural and Environmental
Pathologies of a Tax-Based Boom
Land in Ireland has a particular significance; for the pre-
British Celts, the land was not privately owned, and social
organization was semi-nomadic.2 56 The Irish Celts had still not
engaged in much permanent town building when the British, far
better organized, entered on the scene and ultimately imposed
centuries of dispossession and subdivision on the Irish.2 57 The
Irish were forced to participate as laborers on the land that had
been taken from them and reworked into a British system of
aristocratic holdings.2 58 With late nineteenth century land reform,
individual small holdings took on heightened importance, and the
desire for more land led to infamous feuds and rivalries.2 59 For
cultural nationalists, the landscape was the repository of historical
memory. For many years, houses abandoned during the Famine
were left standing, as it was believed to be a wrongful act to knock
them down. 26 0  As late as the 1970s, one could journey around
Ireland and see the walls of many abandoned nineteenth century
houses that were left standing.2 6 1
In modern times, beginning with the cities, and slowly
spreading into the countryside, Ireland embarked on a policy of
general destruction of older buildings. 26 2  From the mid-1990s,
new houses were being built at an astonishing rate, and of a garish,
ostentatious quality.2 63 Some areas of the country were designated
256 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 2, 8-9.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 69-141; see also O'TOOLE, supra note 20, at 163
("The other nineteenth-century impulse was land. What do you do with your money?
You put it in property").
260 See JACKSON, supra note 28.
261 Id.
262 See FRANK McDONALD, THE DESTRUCTION OF DUBLIN 4-5 (1985); see also
MCDONALD & Nix, supra note 25, at 17 (warning that "a countryside already blighted by
haphazard housing will be annihilated if the proportion of one-offs continues to
increase").
263 See Sustainable Rural Housing Guidelines for Planning Authorities Department
of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government: Minister's Foreword, IRISH TIMES,
April 13, 2005, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/special/2005/planning/index.htm
[hereinafter Guidelines].
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as tax incentive areas, leading to speculative developments of all
kinds. 21 So-called ribbon development, that is, houses that lined
Irish roads, rather than being concentrated in streets or other
planned settlements, eroded the sense of a coherent countryside
and had the effect of suburbanizing wide swaths of Ireland.2 65
Long-running and costly planning tribunals, designed to uncover
corrupt relationships between politicians and the building industry,
revealed a political class dependent on builders and beholden to
them.26 6 The lack of effective planning policy, despite the
existence of elaborate planning procedures, reflected the cozy
relationship between Irish elected officials and those who profited
from lack of restraint on building.
The EU, dominated by "high regulating" states, both on the
Continent and more recently in northern Europe, took on
environmental issues from an early stage. The EU is unique
among regional trade systems in having a rigorous corresponding
system of consumer, labor, and environmental protections. 2 67 The
level of commitment to these features of EU law rises and falls
over time, but the core set of laws are well established and widely
taken for granted.2 68 As an EU member, Ireland had no choice but
to confront such EU environmental laws as the Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive and the Habitats Directive,
instruments that had the potential to at least slow down the
building boom. 269 Again, with an irony that seemed lost on the
political elites and the general public, those most interested in
preserving Ireland's unique aesthetic and history resorted to using
264 See Eileen Battersby, At War with the Blots on Our Landscape, IRISH TIMES,
(May 22, 2010),
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2010/0522/1224270863018.html.
265 See Guidelines, supra note 263.
266 See generally O'TOOLE, supra note 20 (describing the many investigative
tribunals that operated in Ireland over the past fifteen years and resulted in few
prosecutions relative to the many revelations of corruption).
267 See generally MARTIN HEDEMANN-ROBINsON, ENFORCEMENT OF EUROPEAN
UNION ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES (2006) (providing an
overview of the current legal principles of European Union environmental law
enforcement).
268 See Sara Dillon, The Mirage of EC Environmental Federalism in a Reluctant
Member State Jurisdiction, 8 N.Y.U. ENvT'L. L.J. 1, 30-31 (1999-2000).
269 Id.
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EU environmental law against Ireland.270 Those who claimed to
be representatives of the people continued to insist on the right of
land owners to build whatever they liked, wherever they liked.
Irish nationalists have shown little interest in using law to preserve
the environment.2 7 1 Instead, these forces have shown a tendency
to see European law as detrimental to Irish national interests
whenever any development is delayed because of EU law.272
Ireland has proven itself to be one of the foremost offenders
against European environmental laws, and has gained a reputation
for special recalcitrance in this area. in this respect as well,
Ireland's position has been to take as much as possible on the
economic development side, while arguing that its former
underdevelopment should exempt it from taking environmental
considerations as seriously as the other European states.27 4
270 See EU Law, FRIENDs OF THE IRISH ENVIRONMENT,
http://www.friendsoftheirishenvironment.net/eu/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010) (elaborating
on the work of the environmental group Friends of the Irish Environment in compiling a
list of the environmental law cases taken by the European Commission against Ireland).
271 See McDONALD & Nix, supra note 25, at 17.
272 See Dillon, supra note 268, at 30.
273 See McDonald, supra note 120.
274 Other EU Member States with histories of underdevelopment, such as Greece,
Spain and Portugal, have had problems with environmental compliance as well. Dillon,
supra note 268, at 2.
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VI. Conclusion: Ireland, the "PIIGS," and a New Post-Lisbon
Reality275
The enlargement of the EU to include many of the countries of
Eastern Europe represented the end of one phase of the Irish
relationship with the EU, and with the rest of the world. Ireland's
ability to take resources from the EU, even as it was ignoring
underlying concepts of cooperation and solidarity, could only
work as long as this behavior was confined to Ireland. Ireland,
being small and historically disadvantaged, was allowed by the
European Commission, and by the founding states of the EU, to
proceed with its economic machinations. The Commission
seemed increasingly annoyed with Ireland over time, but also
willing to let the situation remain as it had been. Prior to 2004, it
was an open question as to how the EU institutions would react if
the new entrants from Eastern Europe, Poland for instance, began
to imitate Irish tax competition-based behavior. Clearly, this
would be a more serious matter, one that could threaten the entire
EU project.
Indeed, the unprecedented scale of the 2004 enlargement
brought forth a great deal of anti-EU sentiment across Europe, not
just in an Ireland afraid that its special benefits within Europe
would come to an end. The so-called "Constitutional Treaty"
overseen by Valery Giscard D'Estaing was rejected via
referendum in both France and the Netherlands, in part because
275 Ireland is hardly the only country in the eurozone to be experiencing a dramatic
downturn; along with Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain, Ireland is part of group of
countries unflatteringly designated the "PIIGS". See Andrew Bell, Euro View:
Weathering the Market Storm, FT ADVISER (March 15, 2010),
http://www.ftadviser.com/InvestmentAdviser/Investments/Region/EuropeExcludingUK/
Comment/article/20100315/22b5c2fa-2b54-1 ldf-baff-00144f2af8e8/Euro-view-
Weathering-the-market-storm.jsp ("Soaring budget deficits and weak trade
competitiveness have undermined confidence in the Piigs ... economies' ability to
service their debt."). The EU is currently finalizing plans to bail out Greece, among the
hardest hit of the PIIGS group of eurozone countries. See id. Because of participation in
the euro, these countries can no longer take such steps as devaluation of the currency.
See id. In order to preserve the value of the euro, these countries are required to slash
public spending, a fate now being endured by Ireland as well. See id. Some believe this
crisis could lead to a breakup of the euro zone. See Alistair Barr, Managers See
Contagion from Greek Crisis, Survey Finds, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/managers-see-
contagion-from-greek-crisis-survey-2010-03-09 (quoting one analyst as stating that, "[i]f
Greece fails by itself or contagion takes down the PIIGS, the euro zone may splinter.").
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the citizens of these countries were feeling a generalized
frustration with the EU.276 The EU Constitution, meant to be the
end game of political union, was repackaged as the Lisbon Treaty,
a set of treaty amendments designed mainly to improve the EU's
profile on the world stage.2 77 Only Ireland required that these
amendments be put to the vote of the people in the form of a
referendum.27 8 As described above, in June of 2008 the Irish
people, to wild rejoicing, rejected the Lisbon treaty changes.2 79 In
October of 2009, in a complete reversal, they gave overwhelming
support to the same treaty. It is unlikely that Irish voters changed
their view of the content of the Lisbon Treaty amendments.
Rather, it became apparent that the only way out of the economic
crisis then brewing was to rely on the EU.2 80
At some point in the near future, the EU should energetically
and enthusiastically revive the idea that European solidarity
requires coordination of corporate taxation rates across the EU and
a crackdown on tax avoidance schemes.281  Achievement of the
European social market ideal requires significant investment in the
276 For one set of explanations of the complex political factors at work, see Anke
Grosskopf, Why 'Non' and 'Nee' to the EU Constitution? Reconsidering the Shock of
the Dutch and French Referenda (May 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.unc.eduleuce/eusa2007/papers/grosskopf-a-0lh.pdf. For a contrasting view
of the French and Dutch rejections of the EU's Constitutional Treaty, and the link
between these negative votes and the drafting of the Lisbon Reform Treaty, see Grainne
De Burca, Reflections on the EU's Path from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon
Treaty (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 1124586), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1124586.
277 See Andreas Ziegler, The Lisbon Treaty, JURIST LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH
(Jan. 25, 2010), http://jurist.law.pitt.edulannotationsy/2010/0llisbon-treaty.php
(describing the principal features of the Lisbon Reform Treaty, including the new, high-
profile positions created to allow both an EU President and an EU High Representative
for Foreign Affairs to represent the EU on the world stage).
278 See Gavin Barrett, Brief Reflections on the Holding of a Referendum in Ireland
on the Treaty of Lisbon: A Response to Rossa Fanning (Apr. 24, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript) (explaining why Ireland is uniquely inclined to subject all major EU treaty
changes to a popular referendum), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1 125246.
279 See THE BROOKINGS INST., supra note 11.
280 See supra note 15 and accompanying text
281 This has occurred, as the idea of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base is
again being considered in a European Parliament commission. See Pat Leahy, Common
European Tax Base 'As Soon As Possible', THE SUNDAY BUSINESS POST ONLINE
(January 17, 2010), http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2010/01/17/story46811.asp.
2010] 55
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
public good. This "social market" orientation is inconsistent with
the position that the EU Member States should be competing for
investment through inducements like strikingly low rates of
taxation on profits.
The supranational European project, while variable through
time and space, is a law-based, forward-moving construct,
designed to transform the raw material of nationalism and create
structures aimed at the establishment of peace and prosperity.
Whatever internal transformation ought to occur with EU
membership simply did not occur within Ireland. This hypothesis
should be tested in light of the extraordinary nature of Irish
political corruption and the reliance on tax avoidance schemes
established and/or tolerated by successive Irish governments for
the benefit of both Irish indigenous elites and international
investors. The EU itself, particularly the European Commission,
ought to have taken note of Ireland's contradictory position some
years ago. The tragedy for Ireland itself is multi-faceted. Not
only did Ireland fail to enter into the "transformative" aspect of
EU membership, it also took advantage of EU membership in
order to indulge some of its own worst political tendencies: short
term gain and dependency. This problematic stance is symbolized
in Ireland's single-minded reliance on ultra-low tax rates and tax
avoidance schemes as the engine of economic growth. This
approach has been internally and externally damaging, and Ireland
is now at a crossroads in its modern history. With the Irish
example as a cautionary tale, the EU should now move to
articulate a set of fiscal imperatives reflective of its larger
foundational ideals.
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